Classification de flux applicatifs et détection d'intrusion dans le trafic Internet by Korczynski, Maciej
Classification de flux applicatifs et de´tection d’intrusion
dans le trafic Internet
Maciej Korczynski
To cite this version:
Maciej Korczynski. Classification de flux applicatifs et de´tection d’intrusion dans le trafic
Internet. Autre [cs.OH]. Universite´ de Grenoble, 2012. Franc¸ais. <NNT : 2012GRENM087>.
<tel-00858571>
HAL Id: tel-00858571
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00858571
Submitted on 5 Sep 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
THÈSE
Pour obtenir le grade de
DOCTEUR DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE GRENOBLE
Spécialité : Informatique
Arrêté ministérial : 7 août 2006
Présentée par
Maciej KORCZYN´SKI
Thèse dirigée par Andrzej Duda
préparée au sein de UMR 5217 - LIG - Laboratoire d’Informatique
de Grenoble
et de École Doctorale Mathématiques, Sciences et Technologies
de l’Information, Informatique (EDMSTII)
Classifying Application Flows
and Intrusion Detection in
Internet Traffic
Thèse soutenue publiquement le 26 Novembre 2012,
devant le jury composé de :
Mr Jean-Marc Thiriet
Professeur, Université Joseph Fourier, Président
Mr Philippe Owezarski
Chargé de recherche au CNRS, Université de Toulouse, Rapporteur
Mr Guillaume Urvoy-Keller
Professeur, Université de Nice, Rapporteur
Mr Andrzej Pach
Professeur, AGH University of Science and Technology, Examinateur
Mr Andrzej Duda
Professeur, Grenoble INP - ENSIMAG, Directeur de thèse

iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank most especially my supervisor and mentor Prof. Andrzej
Duda. You taught me a great deal about how to do research. Thank you for your
trust and freedom in exploring diﬀerent research directions. I would like to express
my gratitude for your contributions to this work including sleepless nights before
deadlines and your invaluable support in my future projects.
I am also very grateful to Dr. Lucjan Janowski and Dr. Georgios Androulidakis
for your guidance, patience, and encouragement at the early stage of my research.
Thanks for all that I have learnt from you.
I would like to thank Marcin Jakubowski for sharing your network administrator
experience and packet traces without which this research would not have been
possible.
I am also thankful to my friends from the Drakkar team, especially to Bogdan,
Ana, Isa, Nazim, Micha l, my oﬃce mates Carina, Maru, Mustapha, and Martin as
well as my friends from other teams, especially to Soﬁa, Azzeddine, and Reinaldo
for sharing the ”legendary” and the more diﬃcult moments of PhD students life.
To my girlfriend and best friend Audrey for your patience with my passion for
research and continuous support even if it requires making diﬃcult life decisions.
Thank you so much!
Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my parents and grandparents for your
unconditional love, endless support throughout my entire life, and understanding
of my decisions.

vAbstract
The subject of traﬃc classiﬁcation is of great importance for eﬀective network
planning, policy-based traﬃc management, application prioritization, and security
control. Although it has received substantial attention in the research community
there are still many unresolved issues, for example how to classify encrypted traﬃc
ﬂows. This thesis is composed of four parts. The ﬁrst part presents some theoretical
aspects related to traﬃc classiﬁcation and intrusion detection, while in the following
three parts we tackle speciﬁc classiﬁcation problems and propose accurate solutions.
In the second part, we propose an accurate sampling scheme for detecting SYN
ﬂooding attacks as well as TCP portscan activity. The scheme examines TCP
segments to ﬁnd at least one of multiple ACK segments coming from the server.
The method is simple and scalable, because it achieves a good detection with a
False Positive Rate close to zero even for very low sampling rates. Our trace-based
simulations show that the eﬀectiveness of the proposed scheme only relies on the
sampling rate regardless of the sampling method.
In the third part, we consider the problem of detecting Skype traﬃc and classi-
fying Skype service ﬂows such as voice calls, skypeOut, video conferences, chat, ﬁle
upload and download. We propose a classiﬁcation method for Skype encrypted traf-
ﬁc based on the Statistical Protocol IDentiﬁcation (SPID) that analyzes statistical
values of some traﬃc attributes. We have evaluated our method on a representative
dataset to show excellent performance in terms of Precision and Recall.
The last part deﬁnes a framework based on two complementary methods for clas-
sifying application ﬂows encrypted with TLS/SSL. The ﬁrst one models TLS/SSL
session states as a ﬁrst-order homogeneous Markov chain. The parameters of the
Markov models for each considered application diﬀer a lot, which is the basis for
accurate discrimination between applications. The second classiﬁer considers the
deviation between the timestamp in the TLS/SSL Server Hello message and the
packet arrival time. It improves the accuracy of application classiﬁcation and al-
lows eﬃcient identiﬁcation of Skype ﬂows. We combine the methods using a Naive
Bayes Classiﬁer (NBC). We validate the framework with experiments on three recent
datasets—we apply our methods to the classiﬁcation of seven popular applications
that use TLS/SSL for security. The results show a very good performance.
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Re´sume´
Le sujet de la classiﬁcation de traﬁc re´seau est d’une grande importance pour
la planiﬁcation de re´seau eﬃcace, la gestion de traﬁc a` base de re`gles, la gestion
de priorite´ d’applications et le controˆle de se´curite´. Bien qu’il ait rec¸u une atten-
tion conside´rable dans le milieu de la recherche, ce the`me laisse encore de nom-
breuses questions en suspens comme, par exemple, les me´thodes de classiﬁcation
des ﬂux de traﬁcs chiﬀre´s. Cette the`se est compose´e de quatre parties. La premie`re
pre´sente quelques aspects the´oriques lie´s a` la classiﬁcation de traﬁc et a` la de´tec-
tion d’intrusion. Les trois parties suivantes traitent des proble`mes spe´ciﬁques de
classiﬁcation et proposent des solutions pre´cises.
Dans la deuxie`me partie, nous proposons une me´thode d’e´chantillonnage pre´cise
pour de´tecter les attaques de type ”SYN ﬂooding”et ”portscan”. Le syste`me examine
les segments TCP pour trouver au moins un des multiples segments ACK provenant
du serveur. La me´thode est simple et e´volutive, car elle permet d’obtenir une
bonne de´tection avec un taux de faux positif proche de ze´ro, meˆme pour des taux
d’e´chantillonnage tre`s faibles. Nos simulations base´es sur des traces montrent que
l’eﬃcacite´ du syste`me propose´ repose uniquement sur le taux d’e´chantillonnage,
inde´pendamment de la me´thode d’e´chantillonnage.
Dans la troisie`me partie, nous conside´rons le proble`me de la de´tection et de la
classiﬁcation du traﬁc de Skype et de ses ﬂux de services tels que les appels vocaux,
SkypeOut, les vide´o-confe´rences, les messages instantane´s ou le te´le´chargement de
ﬁchiers. Nous proposons une me´thode de classiﬁcation pour le traﬁc Skype chiﬀre´
base´ sur le protocole d’identiﬁcation statistique (SPID) qui analyse les valeurs statis-
tiques de certains attributs du traﬁc re´seau. Nous avons e´value´ notre me´thode sur
un ensemble de donne´es montrant d’excellentes performances en termes de pre´ci-
sion et de rappel. La dernie`re partie de´ﬁnit un cadre fonde´ sur deux me´thodes
comple´mentaires pour la classiﬁcation des ﬂux applicatifs chiﬀre´s avec TLS/SSL.
La premie`re mode´lise des e´tats de session TLS/SSL par une chaˆıne de Markov ho-
moge`ne d’ordre 1. Les parame`tres du mode`le de Markov pour chaque application
conside´re´e diﬀe`rent beaucoup, ce qui est le fondement de la discrimination entre
les applications. La seconde me´thode de classiﬁcation estime l’e´cart d’horodatage
du message Server Hello du protocole TLS/SSL et l’instant d’arrive´e du paquet.
Elle ame´liore la pre´cision de classiﬁcation des applications et permet l’identiﬁcation
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eﬃcace des ﬂux Skype. Nous combinons les me´thodes en utilisant une Classiﬁcation
Naive Baye´sienne (NBC). Nous validons la proposition avec des expe´rimentations
sur trois se´ries de donne´es re´centes. Nous appliquons nos me´thodes a` la classiﬁcation
de sept applications populaires utilisant TLS/SSL pour la se´curite´. Les re´sultats
montrent une tre`s bonne performance.
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Overview of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1 Motivations
”Accurate identification and categorization of network traffic according to appli-
cation type is an important element of many network management tasks such as
flow prioritization, traffic shaping/policing, and diagnostic monitoring.” [1]
”Classifying traffic flows according to the applications that generate them is an
important task for (a) effective network planning and design, and (b) monitoring
the trends of the applications in operational networks.” [2]
”Accurate network traffic classification is fundamental to numerous network ac-
tivities, from security monitoring to accounting, and from Quality of Service to
providing operators with useful forecasts for long-term provisioning.” [3]
”The subject of traffic classification has a crucial importance for effective network
planning, policy-based traffic management, application prioritization, and security
control.” (cf. Abstract)
When reading numerous publications in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation and
intrusion detection many of them in the ﬁrst place emphasize its importance for op-
erators, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and local network administrators. How-
ever, for the sake of completeness let us take a look at the problem from a diﬀerent,
user’s perspective. Many of our every day activities are closely associated with and
dependent on properly working Internet connections. Our daily habits consist of
checking our emails (usually two accounts, i.e. professional and private), reading
online news, etc. Other ”crucial” activities are related to our Facebook and Twitter
accounts, daily routine often includes Skype calls. While some of us like online
shopping others prefer diﬀerent kinds of entertainment such as online gaming or
watching sport events in the pay-per-view (ppv) system, and many more. Many
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of our daily, legal routines would not be possible without research and industry
eﬀorts in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation. This is why this subject has received
substantial attention in the research community and still continues to grow.
Traﬃc classiﬁcation is, however, a challenging task due to a massive proliferation
of new applications and new ways of spreading and infecting unaware, legitimate
users with malicious software. Moreover, existing programs tend to use more so-
phisticated communication mechanisms to bypass security checks. As a result, we
observe a race between illegal applications, such as streaming pirated videos, im-
proving their obfuscation methods and operators searching for new solutions to
ﬁlter unwanted traﬃc and prioritize remaining applications. Although we witness
much research interest in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation and intrusion detection,
many issues still remain unsolved and even though research community ﬁnds appro-
priate methods, new countermeasures appear rapidly. For example, classiﬁcation
approaches proposed some years ago and based on identifying network ﬂows accord-
ing to corresponding ports or regular expressions in unencrypted packet header are
not eﬀective any longer due to port randomization and traﬃc encryption respec-
tively.
Some of the problems presented in this thesis arose after extensive discussions
with the administrator of the campus network at AGH University of Science and
Technology in Cracow, whereas some others appeared from an in-depth analysis of
the existing literature. We further attempt to address these problems by designing
proof-of-concept classiﬁers. Where we possibly could, we have evaluated our classi-
ﬁcation methods on real-world datasets captured at edge routers to show excellent
performance in terms of diﬀerent criteria. Methods presented in the thesis deal with
very diﬀerent aspects of traﬃc classiﬁcation, from network attack detection to the
classiﬁcation of encrypted applications.
1.2 Overview of the thesis
The presented work is divided into four parts composed of dense chapters. Each
part of the thesis starts with a short introduction chapter with brieﬂy described
contributions and the list of corresponding publications (if applicable). Moreover,
practical parts involve a complementary discussion on theoretical issues speciﬁc to
the addressed problems. Finally, we brieﬂy survey the related work relevant to each
part of the thesis.
In Part I, we describe some traﬃc classiﬁcation aspects. We present a tax-
onomy of network traﬃc classiﬁcation as well as a short discussion on intrusion
detection methods. Part II introduces an accurate method for SYN ﬂooding attack
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and portscan activity detection using sampling techniques to limit the volume of
inspected data. In the third and fourth part of the thesis, we focus on encrypted
traﬃc classiﬁcation. In Part III, we develop a hybrid methodology based on ﬂow and
content features for identifying TCP Skype ﬂows tunneled over the SSL protocol
and classifying its service ﬂows. In Part IV, we propose a framework for classifying
TLS/SSL ﬂows of various applications.

Part I
State of the Art

Chapter 2
Introduction
The importance of appropriate traﬃc classiﬁcation methods continues to grow.
They are essential for eﬀective network planning, policy-based traﬃc management,
application prioritization, and security control. However, traditional classiﬁcation
methods are becoming less eﬃcient, because new applications begin to use sophis-
ticated obfuscation mechanisms and an increased number of applications make use
of encryption to avoid security checks. Moreover, applications are rapidly adapting
to counteract attempts to identify certain types of traﬃc, creating new challenges
for traﬃc classiﬁcation schemes.
We use the expression traffic classification to refer to two areas of our interest
according to speciﬁc goals, namely to application classification and intrusion detec-
tion as well as to methods of classifying traﬃc data sets based on features passively
observed in the Internet traﬃc. In the following chapter, we discuss the above-
mentioned aspects of traﬃc classiﬁcation with respect to classiﬁcation goals—we
start with the formal deﬁnition of traﬃc classiﬁcation, followed by a brief survey
on the classiﬁcation and intrusion detection methods. Finally, we introduce two es-
sential concepts of the ground truth and the metrics of classiﬁcation performance.
2.1 Contributions of Part I
The main contribution of this part is an extension to the payload-based tax-
onomy based on the research presented in the thesis. More speciﬁcally, we intro-
duce a more general taxonomy of payload-based methods in comparison to existing
ones. We propose to distinguish between the type of data to be analyzed rather
than between veriﬁcation or processing techniques. We make a distinction be-
tween message-based and header-based analysis and we separate the analysis of
lower-layer protocol headers, in particular network and transport layers, from the
application-layer protocol header. We argue that in some classiﬁcation problems
the analysis of lower-layer protocol ﬁelds is suﬃcient, while in other cases a more
detailed application-layer protocol header analysis is required.
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3.1 Definition of Traffic Classification
Traﬃc classiﬁcation is a research area that helps us to understand the nature
of the Internet traﬃc. It consist of examining IP packets to extract some speciﬁc
features to answer some questions related to its origin, the carried content, or user
intensions. Frequently, it deals with packet ﬂows deﬁned as sequences of packets
uniquely identiﬁed by the same source IP address, source port, destination IP ad-
dress, destination port, and transport layer protocol. However, packets might be
grouped in any way according to classiﬁcation needs.
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Let us now formalize the trafic classification problem. A pattern p represents
the object under analysis. Each pattern is described by a set of n features that
have been derived from the analyzed traﬃc. Thus, it can be interpreted by the
n-dimensional random variable X that corresponds to an accurate set of features:
p→ x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xd).
In the application classification problem, where p could be represented by ﬂows,
we attempt to assign each of them to one of the given application classes deﬁned by
a random variable Y : y = {y1, y2, . . . , yc, yc+1}. Y = yc+1 means that the analyzed
ﬂow is not recognized as any of the given classes, i.e., it is unknown.
In the intrusion detection problem p could be represented by the aggregated
traﬃc directed to the speciﬁc IP destination address. Thus, intrusion detection
refers to a binary classiﬁcation problem—we attempt to verify if the traﬃc to an-
alyze corresponds to malicious behavior. Random variable Y takes values in the
set {y0, y1}, where Y = y0 means that the traﬃc conforms to legitimate behavior,
whereas Y = y1 indicates malicious activity.
In the presented thesis, solving the traﬃc classiﬁcation problems corresponds to
deﬁning classiﬁers that categorize each pattern into one of c => 2 classes.
3.2 Classification Goals
Although the research area of traﬃc classiﬁcation is rather speciﬁc, the motiva-
tions of research papers are not identical [4].
In Figure 3.1, we present typical classiﬁcation objectives or, in other words, three
diﬀerent domains, where proposed methods operate. More precisely, some methods
classify traﬃc according to its category, i.e., whether the traﬃc represents bulk-
transfer, peer-to-peer (p2p) content sharing, games, multimedia, web, or attacks [3,
5, 6, 7, 2]. It is also referred to as the coarse-grained classification goal [8]. A number
of methods aim at identifying the application-level protocol such as FTP, HTTP,
SSH, Telnet [9, 1, 10, 11, 12], also referred to as the finer-grained classification goal
[8]. The last group of methods classiﬁes the traﬃc according to the exact application
that generates traﬃc, such as Skype, Dropbox, eBay.
Unfortunately, users tend to confuse application classiﬁcation with application -
level protocol classiﬁcation (cf. Figure 3.1) [13]. For instance, classiﬁcation of Skype
traﬃc illustrates the problem. It relies on a p2p infrastructure while its primary
objective is Voice over IP (VoIP) service delivery. Moreover, for data transmission
it uses its proprietary Skype protocol, but the HTTP or HTTPS (HTTP over SSL)
protocols might be used as well. As a result, it might not be clear how to classify
such traﬃc. Likewise, due to strict policies enforced by ﬁrewalls and restrictions



18 Chapter 3. Background on Traffic Classification
ﬁrewalls—it randomly selects ports and can switch to port 80 or 443 if it fails to
establish a connection on dynamically chosen ports. As a result, simple inspection
of port numbers is no longer a reliable classiﬁcation mechanism [5, 15], especially
when identifying applications.
Some recent studies critically revisit traﬃc classiﬁcation including methods
based on transport layer ports [16]. One of several insights of their studies is that
ports still remain an important discriminator, particularly when combined with
other features such as packets sizes, TCP ﬂags and protocol information. However,
their classiﬁcation objectives are diﬀerent from those presented in Parts III and IV.
The methods evaluated in their studies aim at application protocol classiﬁcation
rather than in detailed application classiﬁcation.
Maier et al. investigated the characteristics of residential broadband Internet
traﬃc using packet-level traces augmented with the DSL session information [17].
Their most signiﬁcant conclusion is that p2p is no longer dominant traﬃc in terms
of bytes. HTTP once more seems to carry most of the traﬃc. Their classiﬁcation
method was based on a purely port-based approach, showing quite good results
for their dataset. However, for a more detailed analysis aiming at the conﬁrma-
tion of the relevance of the port-based approach, they have examined the HTTP
Content-Type header and the initial part of the HTTP body. Moreover, with this
methodology, they only attempt to distinguish between p2p and HTTP. Finally,
when analyzing application evolution, presented in Figure 3.2, we can observe that
restricted applications tend to encrypt/tunnel their traﬃc through HTTPS or even
through HTTP (e.g. Skype), which makes classiﬁcation of p2p applications a par-
ticularly challenging task.
3.3.2 Payload-based approach
The second content-based approach involves inspecting the packet payload and
for years, it was considered as the most accurate method. As soon as we can identify
a unique payload-based signature, this technique can produce reliable classiﬁcation
results [5, 7]. Moreover, payload-based classiﬁers are often used to establish ground
truth for other methods [16, 18]. Nevertheless, due to privacy issues and payload
encryption other techniques have received more attention in the research commu-
nity. We agree with the primary argument concerning users privacy, but we argue
the common belief that payload-based methods always fail when traﬃc is encrypted
[13, 4].
Risso et al. introduced a taxonomy of payload-based classiﬁcation approaches
regarding payload verification and processing methods. The former deﬁnes four de-
grees of veriﬁcation. The ﬁrst aims at locating some message signatures, the second
3.3. Classification Approaches 19
syntactical one, checks if the message is well formed, e.g., HTTP payload must con-
tain HTTP headers. The third relates to protocol conformance, controlling client-
server message exchange, while the semantic one veriﬁes the type of object sent
by the application layer protocol. The second taxonomy discusses payload-based
processing methods, namely packet-based and message-based techniques, from a
simple one that operates by checking some basic packet-header information to a
sophisticated one that consists of inspecting and interpreting exactly what each
application transmits.
In this thesis, we propose a more general taxonomy of payload-based classiﬁ-
cation concerning the type of data to be analyzed rather than veriﬁcation or pro-
cessing techniques. We propose to make a distinction between message-based and
header-based analysis as shown in Figure 3.3. Moreover, we propose to separate the
analysis of lower-layer protocol headers (until transport layer) from the application-
layer protocol header since in some classiﬁcation problems, the analysis based only
on network and transport layer ﬁelds is suﬃcient, while in other cases, a more
detailed application-layer protocol header analysis is required.
The method presented in Part II of this thesis illustrates an example of lower-
layer protocol header analysis—we have proposed a scheme for detecting SYN ﬂood-
ing attacks and portscans that is based on identifying TCP SYN segments and cor-
responding ACKs. Furthermore, Sen et al. [7] presented an approach to identify
the eDonkey protocol based on the application layer header analysis. More specif-
ically, the authors discovered that signaling and downloading TCP packets have
a particular eDonkey header on top of the TCP header. In the same paper, the
authors propose a simple signature to reveal the Kazaa traﬃc based on the analysis
of the HTTP protocol. Now, let us consider TLS/SSL encrypted traﬃc. Indeed,
both message and ”old” application layer protocol header are encrypted so simple
pattern veriﬁcation methods based on signatures will fail. In Part III and IV of this
thesis, we adopt a payload-based approach to demonstrate that it is still possible
to eﬀectively reveal and classify encrypted ﬂows by inspecting ”new” application
layer protocol, namely TLS/SSL. Moreover, Bonﬁglio et al. have investigated the
Skype traﬃc transported by the UDP protocol [18]. They concluded that the en-
crypted Skype UDP messages can be identiﬁed by examining the initial portion of
the payload the so-called Start of Message (SoM) located on top of the header.
3.3.3 Host behavior-based approach
Host behavior-based approaches [2, 19] can potentially address some limitations
of content-based methods. The approach is based on the analysis of the social
behavior of network hosts and can be observable even when payload is encrypted.
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More speciﬁcally, social interactions between communicating hosts are represented
by graphs that visualize the ”who-talks-to-whom” relationship. The classiﬁcation
consists of matching previously observed graphs with graphs resulting from the
behavior of a host under examination [2].
BLINC, for example, proposes an interesting method based on observing and
recognizing models of host behavior and then classifying its ﬂows according to the
models [2]. It analyzes patterns at three levels: (i) social level—it inspects the
interaction with other hosts, (ii) functional level—it checks whether a host acts as
a consumer or a provider of the service (or both), (iii) application level—it records
the transport layer ports to identify the origin of the application.
Iliofotou et al. introduce the idea of Traﬃc Dispersion Graphs (TDGs) as a
promising monitoring and classiﬁcation tool [19]. Their work on TDGs represents
a natural extension of the previous approach. More precisely, they propose a diﬀer-
ent way of looking at network traﬃc—they focus on network-wide interactions of
hosts instead of modeling single host behavior. The same authors extended their
previous work and developed a proof of the concept to detect p2p traﬃc [20]. Their
application classiﬁcation framework, evaluated on real-world backbone traces, can
identify 90% of p2p ﬂows with 95% precision.
3.3.4 Flow feature-based approach
The second fundamentally diﬀerent group of content independent methods uses
ﬂow features such as average packet sizes, packet inter-arrival times, or ﬂow dura-
tions (cf. Section 3.5). Features are computed over multiple packets grouped in ﬂows
and further used in the training process that associates sets of features with known
traﬃc classes. The classiﬁcation consists of a statistical comparison of unknown
traﬃc with previously learned rules [21]. Flow feature-based approaches mainly
include data mining techniques and machine learning algorithms. We do not, how-
ever, describe these techniques when discussing approaches based on the analysis
of ﬂow features because more and more other approaches including content-based
ones use machine learning in classiﬁcation purposes. Instead, we brieﬂy discuss
classiﬁcation methods in Section 3.4.2.
For example, Bonﬁglio et al. [18] presented a framework based on two com-
plementary techniques to reveal Skype traﬃc. The second approach is based on a
stochastic characterization of Skype traﬃc in terms of the packet arrival rate and
packet length, which are used as features of a decision process based on a Naive
Bayesian Classiﬁer (NBC).
Moore et al. [3] proposed a statistical approach to classify traﬃc into diﬀerent
types of services based on a combination of ﬂow features such as ﬂow length, time
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between consecutive ﬂows, or inter-arrival times. The classiﬁcation process using
a bayesian classiﬁer combined with a kernel density estimation method leads to an
accuracy of up to 95%.
3.4 Methods
While machine learning algorithms using ﬂow features for traﬃc classiﬁcation
received substantial attention, the content-based approaches mainly relied a simple
pattern matching [13]. In recent studies, however, several hybrid solutions based on
machine learning methods and taking into account content features were proposed
[22, 23, 18, 24, 25, 12]. In this section, we present a brief survey of some popular
methods (cf. Figure 3.4) used in classiﬁcation approaches discussed in the previous
section.
3.4.1 Pattern Matching
A few years ago, simple pattern matching combined with content-based ap-
proaches was one of the most accurate classiﬁcation methods. However, pattern
matching based on identifying the application level signatures is less eﬀective (if
possible) in the case of encrypted traﬃc. In one of the most interesting papers
considering the pattern matching problem in recent years [7], the authors provide
an eﬃcient method for identifying ﬁve popular p2p applications through applica-
tion level signatures. All of the proposed signatures, however, become useless once
traﬃc encryption or tunneling methods are applied. Risso et al. [13], argue that
content-based approaches are mainly based on pattern veriﬁcation, thus they always
fail in the case of encrypted traﬃc and often in the case of tunneled traﬃc. We
argue, however, that a key challenge in encrypted traﬃc classiﬁcation is to replace
traditional pattern veriﬁcation with more sophisticated methods based on statistical
ﬁngerprints.
3.4.2 Machine Learning
In the last few years, machine learning algorithms using ﬂow features for traﬃc
classiﬁcation has received substantial attention [26, 27, 16, 3]. More recently, several
authors have investigated the use of machine learning techniques with payload in-
formation [22, 23, 18, 25]. In general, machine learning algorithms are categorized
into supervised learning and unsupervised learning (cf. Figure 3.4). Supervised
learning requires some labeled data to generate models of applications of interest,
whereas unsupervised learning clusters ﬂows with similar characteristics. Since our
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This section provides only some insight into methods used in the thesis. The
formal deﬁnitions are presented in relevant chapters.
3.5 Feature Selection
As it was highlighted in the previous section, the majority of traﬃc classiﬁcation
methods use some form of machine learning techniques to build traﬃc models from
observed data. They share the general idea of measuring the distance of new ob-
jects from the learned models that represent particular traﬃc classes. In practice,
however, the eﬀectiveness of traﬃc classiﬁcation frameworks strongly depends on
the choice of traﬃc attributes or features. Two families of features have recently
been used for traﬃc analysis. The ﬁrst one consists of the in-depth analysis of the
packet content, whereas the second one relies on ﬂow-level statistics.
Various packet content features have been applied to traﬃc classiﬁcation, such
as an IP address [31, 32], a transport layer protocol [33], a packet (payload) size
[33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38], or particular values in TCP and UDP headers [31, 18], for ex-
ample, a port number [5, 3, 39, 40, 41] and TCP ﬂags [42, 43, 44, 45, 32, 41]. While
packet header based features have proved to be eﬀective in traﬃc classiﬁcation and
against some network attacks, other classiﬁcation problems require more advanced
payload processing techniques. Thus, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) methods have
been proposed to create some payload-based signatures based on an in-depth anal-
ysis of application layer data [23, 18, 22, 5, 2, 46, 18]. Moreover, features based
on the relationship between various metrics have been applied in many classiﬁca-
tion problems [23, 22, 2]. For example, the detection methods based on matching
TCP control segments such as SYN and FIN (or RST) pairs have been proposed
in intrusion detection [42]. Furthermore, the approach based on the relationship
between the number of destination IP addresses and ports for speciﬁc applications
per source IP has been proposed in traﬃc classiﬁcation [2].
On the other hand, researchers propose the use of ﬂow-level features, such as
ﬂow duration [33, 3, 27, 47], a number of packets per ﬂow [33, 31, 32], a variance
and/or an average, minimum, maximum value of inter-arrival time [33, 31, 34, 18, 3,
26, 48, 27, 47, 49, 50], packet (or payload) sizes per ﬂow (or per few ﬁrst packets of
the ﬂow) [31, 51, 18, 2, 3, 26, 52, 27, 49, 50], a bit rate [51, 35], a round-trip time [35],
a ﬂow size [3, 27], or time between consecutive ﬂows [3]. Moreover, joint application
of some metrics have been proposed, for example, distribution of ﬂow duration and
number of packets transferred [53], or direction and packet size distribution [22].
In the second part of this thesis, we propose a scheme that relies on the simple
and robust packet header feature based on matching TCP SYN segments to at least
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one of multiple ACK segments coming from the server side. In Part III, we present
a hybrid method that combines traﬃc ﬂow features with complex DPI elements
to identify Skype service ﬂows (cf. Section 9.1.2). Finally, the last part deﬁnes
a framework based on two complementary methods applying payload features for
classifying application ﬂows encrypted with TLS/SSL. The ﬁrst proposed Markov
Classiﬁer takes into account message types in a TLS/SSL session as a classiﬁcation
feature while the second classiﬁer considers the deviation between the timestamp
in the TLS/SSL Server Hello message and the packet arrival time.
A common problem in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation is to decide among
diﬀerent features to be used. The feature selection can be done manually, but a
better strategy is to have a learning algorithm that decides which set of features
is the best. The problem of automatic feature selection has been well studied in
the context of traﬃc classiﬁcation [54, 55, 56, 57] and anomaly detection [58]. In
the third part of this thesis, we face the problem of selecting an appropriate subset
of features called attribute meters. We applied a method called forward selection
based on the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) [59]. It consists of starting with an
initial attribute in the model trying attributes one by one, and adopting them, if
they improve the classiﬁcation performance.
3.6 Intrusion Detection
In this section we focus on a special case of traﬃc classiﬁcation, namely on in-
trusion detection. At ﬁrst sight, the main diﬀerence between intrusion detection
and, for instance, application identiﬁcation is the number of traﬃc classes consid-
ered in the classiﬁcation process (cf. Section 3.1). Moreover, in terms of traﬃc
classiﬁcation goals discussed in Section 3.2 the objective of intrusion detection is
to categorize traﬃc as either intrusive or legitimate. Nevertheless, the crucial im-
portance of network security resulted in decoupling intrusion detection from traﬃc
classiﬁcation.
Two detection approaches have received substantial attention in the research
community, namely signature-based and anomaly-based detection. Although, they
are opposite in nature, they share a common drawback—they require an in-depth
knowledge of network traﬃc to be eﬀective. Therefore, they are collectively referred
to as knowledge-based detection approaches [60]. A relatively new research area in
intrusion detection that can potentially overcome the limitations of knowledge-based
approaches relies on unsupervised anomaly detection. In the rest of this section, we
brieﬂy discuss three approaches summarized in Figure 3.5
The signature-based approach [61] requires an extensive knowledge of security
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Section 5, we focus our attention on more speciﬁc problems we had to face when
proposing a scalable anomaly-detection sampling scheme of high-volume malicious
traﬃc composed of SYN ﬂooding attacks and low-volume portscan activity.
3.7 Ground Truth
The appropriate set of pre-labeled packet traces containing the so-called ground-
truth information is one of the key aspects in any classiﬁcation problem. The two
most popular approaches employ the following procedures. The ﬁrst one consists of
the manual generation of Internet traﬃc by running a broad pool of applications on
many machines. Nevertheless, such a dataset might not cover realistic application
instances and traﬃc characteristics due to the lack of live, human interactions.
The second approach assumes assigning traﬃc labels to all ﬂows by means of DPI
methods after packet capturing. However, simple pattern-matching techniques are
not reliable anymore due to many obfuscation mechanisms and traﬃc encryption.
Moreover, most of the existing methods deal with ground-truth ﬂow labeling in
the protocol domain [1, 16]. A recent ground-truth classiﬁer that could potentially
fulﬁll our requirements is based on a pre-installed client tool to supervise a kernel of
each monitored host [69]. Even if the presented results are very promising, we need
to ﬁnd a number of users who consent to be monitored with the classiﬁer. Finally,
the same authors compare some previous methods based on the joint port analysis
and payload inspection [70]. The experimental results demonstrate that, in many
cases, the ground-truth data provided is incorrect. In this thesis, we do not rely on
any of the systematic solutions presented above. Instead, we try to develop ad hoc
methods that meet our current classiﬁcation needs.
The second dataset used in the evaluation process in Part II has been collected
on the link connecting an operational university campus network at the AGH Uni-
versity of Science and Technology in Cracow to the Internet. We have manually
generated some network attacks by the use of common attacking programs available
in BackTrack linux security distribution [71] against servers set up especially for this
purpose. The traﬃc has been captured on the border router that monitors packets
generated in the controlled part of the network. The methodology is reliable in
obtaining the ground-truth data, but, in addition, it enables us to take advantage
of rich background traﬃc generated by students including recent p2p applications
as well as standard services like web, ftp, or mail.
In Part III, we had to face even more challenging tasks, namely, generating
and labeling Skype service ﬂows. Manual generation of each service separately in
a closed laboratory environment enabled us to eﬀectively obtain the ground-truth
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information. It was particularly diﬃcult due to the p2p nature of Skype resulting in
spreading services on several TCP connections. Another challenge was to manually
distinguish between service ﬂows and the corresponding signaling Skype traﬃc.
To establish the ground truth in the third part of this thesis, we have developed
a simple Domain Name System Classiﬁer (DNSC) to extract encrypted application
ﬂows according to their domain names. More speciﬁcally, DNSC matches hostnames
to signatures of well known applications, such as opera in case of Opera or twitter,
twttr in case of Twitter. The solution presents the number of constraints like
a rather limited classiﬁcation scope. For example, we cannot label Skype ﬂows,
because in general, we are not able to convert IP addresses to domain names.
On the other hand, if the mapping between an IP address and a domain name is
possible, the method can classify ﬂows with a very high conﬁdence level.
3.8 Criteria for Classification Performance
To evaluate any classiﬁcation method we need to deﬁne criteria for classiﬁcation
performance. In this section we discuss the metrics we use to quantify the perfor-
mance of our classiﬁers, namely the False Positive Rate (FPR), the True Positive
Rate (TPR), which is also known as Recall, and Precision. They are deﬁned as
follows:
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
, (3.1)
TPR = Recall =
TP
TP + FN
, (3.2)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(3.3)
The following metrics are built upon the concept of True Positives (TPs), True
Negatives (TNs), False Positives, (FPs), and False Negatives (FNs). These notions
are often used in anomaly detection and traﬃc classiﬁcation where each object is
placed into one of several classes.
To give the reader intuition about the statistical metrics to be used in this thesis,
let us make an analogy. Suppose we want to make a blind test of beer recognition
to test the knowledge of beer according to the brewing process. We classify them
into two categories, i.e., either lager or ale. We select a set of 100 beers—60 of
these are lagers, whereas 40 represent ale. Let us assume that you have classiﬁed
70 beers as being lagers. Actually, 50 of these are lagers, which correspond to the
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number of True Positives, but 20 are ales, which represent the number of False
Positives. Moreover, you categorize 30 beers as ales. Of these, 10 represent in
fact the lager type, whereas 20 of them are indeed ales. Let us focus on the lager
type. True Positive Rate (or Recall) is the number of beers correctly categorized
as lager divided by the total number of beers that are actually lagers—you have
TPR = Recall = 50/(50+10) = 0.833. Moreover, False Positive Rate is the number
of falsely classiﬁed beers as the lager type to the total number of non-lager beers,
FPR = 20/(20 + 20) = 0.5. A complementary measure to Recall is Precision, that
is the number of correctly classiﬁed lager beers to all beers classiﬁed as the lager
type, thus, Precision = 50/(50 + 20) = 0.714.
To assess the performance of the proposed classiﬁcation methods in the second
and fourth part of the thesis we use True Positive and False Positive Rates as clas-
siﬁcation metrics, whereas in Part III we use Precision, Recall, and F -Measure as
classiﬁcation metrics. F -Measure, which combines Precision and Recall, is deﬁned
as:
F -Measure =
2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
, (3.4)
For more speciﬁc examples, please refer to the respective sections describing the
criteria for classiﬁcation performance of each proposed method.
3.9 Summary
So far, we have introduced some background information on traﬃc classiﬁca-
tion important to understand methodologies proposed in this thesis. In Table 6.1,
we present the summary of the discussed issues according to the further described
solutions. In the remaining parts of the thesis, we ﬁrst propose an accurate sam-
pling scheme for defeating SYN ﬂooding attacks and TCP portscans, while in the
two following parts we propose two frameworks for classifying application ﬂows in
encrypted traﬃc.
3.9. Summary 29
Table 3.1: Summary of traﬃc classiﬁcation issues according to proposed so-
lutions
Research area Traﬃc classiﬁcation
Sub-domain Application classiﬁcation Intrusion detection
Proposed solutions
Classifying Classifying A sampling scheme
service ﬂows TLS/SSL for detecting
in the encrypted encrypted SYN ﬂooding attacks
Skype traﬃc application ﬂows and portscans
Classiﬁcation goals Application Application Category
Hybrid: header- Header-based Header-based
Classiﬁcation (L7 protocol (L7 protocol (L2-L4 protocol
approaches header) & ﬂow header) headers)
feature-based
Supervised ML: Supervised ML: Anomaly-based:
SPID algorithm K-L Div. & Rate limiting
Methods based on Markov Chain & method
Kullback-Leibler Naive Bayes
Divergence
Packet size, Message types Rate of TCP SYN
direction, byte and timestamps to ACK segments
Features frequencies, from a TLS/SSL
byte pairs session header
reoccurring, etc.
Manually University University
Ground truth/ generated ﬂows campus campus datasets
datasets in a closed datasets pre- with manually
laboratory labeled with generated attacks
environment DNSC classiﬁer
Performance True Positive and Precision, Recall, True Positive and
Metrics False Positive and F-Measure False Positive
Rates Rates
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Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and portscan activity strongly in-
ﬂuence Internet security. According to a NANOG report [72], the major cause of
denial of service attacks is TCP SYN ﬂooding that consists of sending many SYN
segments from a large number of compromised computers. It prevents victim ma-
chines or even whole subnetworks from oﬀering a service to their legitimate users.
A portscan activity is usually a precursor for an intrusion attempt—a compromised
computer sends multiple SYN segments to probe other hosts for open ports to gain
control over more computers that become potential attackers. SYN ﬂooding and
portscans diﬀer in terms of intensity, behavior, and security threats so usually they
are handled independently. However, both types of traﬃc exploit the inherent asym-
metry in the TCP three-way handshake mechanism and the fact that the victim
cannot authenticate TCP SYN segments it receives. As a result, malicious packets
can easily reach the victim without its approval.
Among various defense mechanisms, SYN ﬂooding detection mechanisms placed
in border routers have received much attention in recent literature [42, 43, 44, 73,
74]. All these methods take advantage of the relationship between TCP control
segments responsible for connection establishment and release. However, they all
may fail when routers sample traﬃc by inspecting only some packets. Eﬃcient traﬃc
monitoring requires advanced sampling techniques to limit the volume of inspected
data. Sampling consists of partial observation of the network traﬃc and drawing
conclusions about the whole behavior of the system. Detecting DDoS attacks and
portscans becomes more diﬃcult when routers sample packets.
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4.1 Contributions of Part II
In this part, we propose a novel and scalable sampling detection scheme of high-
volume malicious traﬃc composed of SYN ﬂooding attacks and low-volume portscan
activity. The scheme examines TCP segments to ﬁnd at least one of multiple ACK
segments coming from the server. In this case, it concludes that the connection
was successfully established so its opening SYN segment was not a part of a SYN
ﬂooding attack or portscan activity. This principle is particularly suitable when
routers sample packets with very low rates. We combine the proposed method with
a rate limiting scheme that controls traﬃc rates and compare with three other rep-
resentative detection methods. We show that our method achieves a high attack
detection rate (True Positive Rate). In comparison with existing methods, we sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the False Positive Rate, i.e., when legitimate packets are classiﬁed
as malicious ones.
We also study the impact of three basic packet sampling techniques proposed by
PSAMP IETF working group [75] on our detection scheme. The results reveal that
even the simplest and the most commonly used sampling technique—systematic
sampling also known as deterministic sampling [76], performs fairly well under low
sampling rates when combined with our detection and rate limiting method. Unlike
some other proposals that used network simulations or experiments on obsolete data
sets with outdated background traﬃc, we validate our scheme on two recent data
sets of network traces captured during real network attacks.
4.2 Relevant Publications for Part II
[45] Maciej Korczyn´ski, Lucjan Janowski, and Andrzej Duda. An Accurate Sam-
pling Scheme for Detecting SYN Flooding Attacks and Portscans. 2011 IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC’11), pages 1–5, June 2011
[77] Maciej Korczyn´ski and Lucjan Janowski. Implementation of The Algorithm
to Detect and Prevent Network Attacks Based on Rate Limiting Method.
Conference on Next Generation Services and Networks - the Technical Aspects,
Application and Market, November 2010
[78] Gilles Berger-Sabbatel, Maciej Korczyn´ski, and Andrzej Duda. Architecture
of a Platform for Malware Analysis and Conﬁnement. 3rd INDECT/IEEE
International Conference on Multimedia Communications, May 2010
[79] Karol Adamski, Maciej Korczyn´ski, and Lucjan Janowski. Trace2Flow. 3rd
NMRG Workshop on Netflow/IPFIX Usage in Network Managament, 2010
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5.1 Analyzing TCP Connections
Analyzing TCP connections is one of the most important issues to address in the
case of SYN ﬂooding attacks and portscans. To open a connection, a client sends
an initial SYN segment. Upon its reception, the server allocates some resources
in the backlog queue and replies with a SYN/ACK segment. Finally, the client
returns an ACK segment (further called Client ACK ) to complete the three-way
handshake. Then, communication goes on until the client or the server sends a
segment with the FIN ﬂag set, a RST segment, or the connection times out. The
potential for exploiting this behavior for denial of service lies in the early allocation
of the server resources. During a TCP SYN ﬂooding attack, the attacker generates
multiple SYN requests without sending the Client ACK to complete the connection
establishment. The requests can quickly exhaust the server memory so it cannot
accept more incoming connection requests.
SYN scanning is fairly similar to TCP SYN ﬂooding attacks: an attacking
computer tries to identify vulnerable hosts by sending multiple TCP SYN segments.
If a port is open, the server responds with a SYN-ACK segment, the port scanner
completes the three-way handshake and immediately closes the connection with a
RST segment.
Several authors proposed interesting detection methods that can operate in bor-
der routers to detect attacks and block them near their sources [42, 43, 44, 73, 74].
They take advantage of the relationships between the TCP control segments: the
appearance of a SYN segment implies further SYN/ACK, Client ACK, and FIN or
RST segments. However, if we want to apply sampling at border routers of Intranets
or parts of operator networks for improved monitoring eﬃciency, considering only
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a small part of packets may degrade the detection capacity of all existing methods,
because low probability of sampling essential control segments is fairly low. For in-
stance, without sampling, the ratio between SYN/ACK and Client ACK segments
should be around 1 for regular traﬃc while it may be diﬀerent when routers use
high sampling rates. Because of this sampling eﬀect, the existing methods result in
poor detection performance especially with respect to the False Positive Rate.
5.2 Sampling Techniques
We consider three basic and most commonly used count-based sampling tech-
niques: systematic, random 1-out-of-N, and uniform probabilistic sampling (cf. Fig-
ure 5.1) proposed by the PSAMP IETF working group [75] and thoroughly investi-
gated in the literature [80]. They present the advantage of simple implementation
with low CPU and memory requirements.
Systematic sampling takes every N-th packet, whereas random 1-out-of-N sam-
pling randomly chooses one packet in every bucket of size N. Finally, uniform proba-
bilistic sampling analyzes every packet with the same small probability. Systematic
sampling, also known as deterministic sampling, is usually used in current network
devices, one example being the Cisco Netﬂow protocol [76].
Some previous work addressed the problem of how sampling techniques inﬂuence
the anomaly detection process [81]. The authors focused on portscan anomalies and
evaluated some representative anomaly detection techniques. Later, they extended
this work and examined various kinds of sampling methods with respect to volume
and scanning anomalies [82]. They concluded that packet sampling can introduce
a fundamental bias by changing traﬃc features and they pointed out the need for
better measurement techniques. Other authors considered the impact of sampling
methods on various detection metrics examined on traces with TCP SYN ﬂooding
attacks [80]. Their results reveal that systematic sampling does not perform well
under low sampling rates when the detection process depends on speciﬁc packet
characteristics like TCP ﬂags. Our detection scheme also overcomes the limitation of
systematic sampling and it becomes as appropriate method as other more enhanced
sampling techniques.


Chapter 6
Design and Evaluation
Contents
6.1 Principles of the Detection Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1.1 TCP History Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1.2 TCP Validation Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1.3 Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2 Evaluation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.1 Dataset Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.2 Criteria for Detection Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.3 Comparing with Existing Detection Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.4 Calibration Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.5 Inﬂuence of the Sampling Process on Diﬀerent Detection Schemes 43
6.2.6 Impact of Sampling Techniques on the Proposed Scheme . . . . 48
6.3 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.1 Principles of the Detection Scheme
To overcome the limitations of methods that match pairs of TCP control seg-
ments, we propose a novel method not limited to the analysis of the three-way
handshake or connection termination. To make it insensitive to sampling, we pro-
pose to ﬁnd at least one of multiple ACK segments coming from the server instead
of looking for a single control segment like SYN/ACK, Client ACK, FIN, or RST.
In other words, to detect legitimate established connections, we take advantage of
the fact that all segments originated from the server with the ACK ﬂag set on and
the SYN ﬂag set oﬀ indicate a successfully established connection. Obviously, when
we sample packets, the probability that the sampled packet contains one of multiple
ACK segments coming from the server is much more greater than when we try to
detect a SYN-SYN/ACK pair. This approach decreases the False Positive Rate
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and does not inﬂuence the True Positive Rate, because in the case of SYN ﬂood-
ing attacks as well as portscans, there are almost no corresponding ACK segments
coming from the server. Finally, it is impossible for the attacker to avoid detection
by spooﬁng control segments.
The proposed scheme is placed in a border router that monitors packets gener-
ated in the controlled part of the network (e.g. an Intranet or an enterprise LAN)
to conﬁne the possible malicious activity close to the source of an attack. It is
composed of three modules: the ﬁrst one validates outgoing TCP segments, the
second one processes corresponding control segments, while the third one changes
the packet ﬁlter list if needed.
We combine the method with a rate limiting scheme. If the traﬃc rate is less
than or equal to a predeﬁned rate for a given IP address, it is allowed to pass the
ﬁlter of outgoing traﬃc, whereas traﬃc that exceeds the rate is dropped or delayed.
We provide a detailed description of the proposed defense scheme below.
6.1.1 TCP History Check
For each sampled packet, we extract its source and destination IP address and
place them in the Source IP List (SIPL) and the Destination IP List (DIPL), respec-
tively. We also extract other information such as timestamps, sequence numbers,
and ACK sequence numbers. When the router samples any outgoing TCP SYN
segment, the module checks if a timeout has elapsed. Depending on the result, it
either resets the source and destination IP lists and allows the segment to pass or
it increases request counter Rsrc corresponding to the particular source IP address
by a positive integer. If there are more unacknowledged SYN segments originating
from the speciﬁc source IP address and Rsrc > R
max
src , then this module decides that
the segments are parts of portscan activity and inserts the source IP address in
the ﬁlter blacklist. Moreover, the module increases request counter Rdst by a posi-
tive integer for a particular destination IP address. If Rdst > R
max
dst , it means that
there is an excessive number of connections to the destination address. Then, as
this behavior may indicate host scan activity or a SYN ﬂooding attack, the module
updates the ﬁlter blacklist to block packets that follow.
6.1.2 TCP Validation Check
The goal of this module is to overcome the problem of losing some useful in-
formation because of sampling. It analyzes TCP control segments to determine
whether the three-way handshake was successfully completed. Any incoming seg-
ment from the server side with the ACK ﬂag set and SYN ﬂag disabled indicates
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Table 6.1: Summary of packet traces
Trace Attack ratio in packets/sec (%)
SYN ﬂooding 4000 packets/sec (20%)
Host scan 120 packets/sec (9%)
Network scan 80 packets/sec (5%)
Clear1 0 packets/sec
Clear2 0 packets/sec
that the particular connection has been successfully established. In this case, the
module decreases the Rsrc (Rdst) counter, because the connection becomes legiti-
mate. Consequently, the requirement Rsrc > R
max
src (Rdst > R
max
dst ) might not be
valid any more, so the module will eventually update the packet ﬁlter blacklist to
permit further outgoing TCP requests from/to the speciﬁed IP address.
6.1.3 Filtering
This module applies all changes to the Access Control List (ACL) in the border
router so that it will discard all malicious segments.
6.2 Evaluation Results
To evaluate the method and compare it with the previous work, we have devel-
oped a prototype in the Matlab environment. We use the open source TracesPlay
program [83] to read traces and to directly put the required data into Matlab.
6.2.1 Dataset Description
We have validated our scheme by means of trace-driven simulations on two data
sets: the ﬁrst traces were gathered on an operational university campus network
at the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) with an average traﬃc of
70-80 Mbits/sec and 20000 packets/sec. It contains a Distributed Denial of Service
attack (TCP SYN ﬂooding attack) captured on May 21, 2003 against a single host
inside the NTUA campus. The second set has been collected on the link connecting
an operational university campus network at the AGH University of Science and
Technology in Cracow with a limit of 45 Mbits/s for incoming and 22 Mbits/s for
outgoing traﬃc. In the evaluation presented in this thesis, we have used set of four
traces collected on March 24, 2010 containing host scans and port scans originated
from the campus network as well as packet traces without malicious activity (cf.
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Table 6.1). Moreover, traces contain rich background traﬃc including recent p2p
applications as well as standard services like web, ftp, or mail. Note that all traces
are bidirectional. We consider them as a meaningful set of traces—if the data set
is not recent, we cannot trust evaluation results especially when we consider the
False Positive Rate because of unrealistic background traﬃc (new applications have
diﬀerent traﬃc characteristics from old ones). Some previous work proposed other
detection algorithms [84, 85], unfortunately the evaluation process uses outdated
data sets.
6.2.2 Criteria for Detection Performance
We consider two meaningful metrics to evaluate the performance of detection
methods: the True Positive Rate (TPR) and the False Positive Rate (FPR) (cf.
Eq. 3.1 and 3.2). Such rates are usually presented as the Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) curve by plotting TPR as a function of FPR. As attack
detection is a Boolean action, the ROC curve is useful for network operators, because
it indicates how to ﬁnd the right tradeoﬀ between the False Positive and True
Positive Rates. However, in our evaluation, we have separated both values and
presented them as a function of the sampling rate, because the evaluation is also
based on traces that do not contain malicious activity.
6.2.3 Comparing with Existing Detection Schemes
To evaluate our scheme, we have compared it with other three representative
detection schemes that leverage TCP relationships: SYN-SYN/ACK, SYN-FIN,
and SYN-Client ACK. The key point of schemes based on matching SYN-SYN/ACK
and SYN-Client ACK pairs is the need of ﬁnding the corresponding SYN/ACK or
Client ACK segment after the ﬁrst SYN segment. The time interval between them
is the RTT (Round Trip Time), usually less than 500ms for more than 90% of
connections. Therefore, the methods have to inspect all control segments during
at least this interval to conclude that the connection was successfully established.
The detection methods based on matching SYN-FIN (or RST) pairs, simply waits
for the corresponding FIN (or RST) segment.
6.2.4 Calibration Process
We had to face the problem of setting the right rate limiting thresholds, i.e.,
maximum values of the request counters corresponding to a regular traﬃc pattern.
We have calibrated them for every examined trace in order to achieve a high TPR
with no FPs regardless of the detection method when we analyze all packets.
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Table 6.2: Rate limiting thresholds obtained during the calibration process
for particular traces.
Trace Rmaxsrc (packets) R
max
dst (packets)
SYN ﬂooding 200 1300
Host scan 300 100
Network scan 400 240
Clear1 50 170
Clear2 120 90
The calibrated values (cf. Table 6.2) reﬂect the relation between outgoing SYNs
per destination and per source and corresponding control packets (SYN/ACK,
Client ACK, FIN). In long-term regular conditions, the TCP semantics requires
a one-to-one match between TCP requests and control segments. Nevertheless,
in reality there is always quite huge diﬀerence between the number of SYNs and
SYN/ACK, Client ACK or FIN packets. Nowadays, the major cause of this dif-
ference is the legitimate p2p traﬃc that initiates TCP connections to unreachable
seeds. We have empirically found that the rate limiting thresholds expressed in
packets are directly proportional to the sampling rate, which alleviates the problem
of losing potentially useful data during the sampling process.
6.2.5 Influence of the Sampling Process on Different Detection
Schemes
In our experiments, we have evaluated the inﬂuence of uniform probabilistic
sampling on the proposed method and compared it with other three schemes. We
have decided to choose this particular sampling method, because it is claimed to be
more eﬀective in the process of packet selection compared to systematic sampling
[80].
We have repeated all simulations to obtain 95% conﬁdence intervals computed
according to the bootstrap method [86].
As shown in Figure 6.1, all methods present approximately the same high TPR
and very low FPR in case of TCP SYN ﬂooding attacks. Similar results for all four
methods are due to setting high rate thresholds corresponding to regular traﬃc for
this particular trace. As we can observe, TPR curves of all detecting schemes are
similar until 0.008% when sampling process increases randomness in the results.
As far as FPR is concerned, we can see that SYN-SYN/ACK, SYN-FIN, SYN-
Client ACK methods deviate from our scheme, but diﬀerences are insigniﬁcant. For
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6.3 Related Work
We can observe that our results overcome the problems considered in the liter-
ature [80] in which the authors evaluated the impact of the same three sampling
methods on anomaly detection techniques. They conclude that methods that rely
on systematic sampling are the worst choice for the detection of attacks based on
certain TCP control ﬂags like SYN or FIN, because such segments are not evenly
distributed across traﬃc. Our scheme alleviates the problem of sampling SYN-
SYN/ACK, SYN-FIN and SYN-Client ACK pairs and proposes a novel solution
based on considering ACK segments.
To detect and mitigate scanning activity, SYN ﬂooding, and DDoS attacks,
several authors proposed various methods [87, 88, 89, 90]. The end-host method
based on SYN cookies is the most commonly used technique to protect against SYN
ﬂooding attacks [91]. Nevertheless, SYN cookies are not able to encode all TCP
options, in particular the window scale and selective acknowledgements that are
widely supported and serve to signiﬁcantly improve TCP performance. Moreover,
the method does not overcome the problem of bandwidth consumption in case
of high-volume TCP SYN attacks. Consequently, we have focused on SYN ﬂood
methods located in border routers [42, 43, 44, 73, 74] and we designed a novel
scheme insensitive to sampling.
6.4 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel scheme for detecting TCP SYN ﬂooding attacks
and portscans that oﬀers good performance in the case of sampling. The scheme
considers TCP connections as legitimate if it samples one of multiple ACK segments
(with disabled SYN ﬂag) coming from the server. This diﬀers from existing methods
based on pair matching of control segments SYN/ACK, FIN (RST) or Client ACK
etc. Our trace-based simulations show that unlike other techniques, the proposed
method signiﬁcantly decreases the False Positive Rate under a sampling process.
Moreover, the results reveal that our method alleviates the problem of losing some
information when systematic sampling is used. The eﬀectiveness of the presented
method only relies on the sampling rate and not on the type of a sampling method.
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Accurate traﬃc identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation are essential for proper network
conﬁguration and security monitoring. Application-layer encryption can however
bypass restrictions set by network conﬁguration and security checks. Several ap-
plication protocols adopted the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption to protect
the conﬁdentiality of communications, which raises new challenges with respect to
traﬃc classiﬁcation and malware detection.
In this chapter, we focus on Skype as an interesting example of encrypted traﬃc
and provide a method for identifying diﬀerent encrypted TCP Skype ﬂows tun-
neled over SSL—we want to discriminate between voice calls, video conferencing,
skypeOut calls, chat, and ﬁle sharing. Previous papers on Skype concentrated on
its architecture and the authentication phase [33, 31, 34], on the mechanisms for
ﬁrewall and NAT traversal [92] as well as on characterizing traﬃc streams generated
by VoIP calls and Skype signaling [51, 35]. Bonﬁglio et al. proposed identiﬁcation
methods for encrypted UDP Skype traﬃc [18], but no work has tackled the problem
of how to classify encrypted TCP ﬂows generated by all Skype services.
Skype exempliﬁes the problem of identifying encrypted ﬂows, because it multi-
plexes several services using the same ports: VoIP calls, video conferencing, instant
messaging, or ﬁle transfer. A network administrator may assign a higher priority
to VoIP calls, but other ﬂows may also beneﬁt in an illegitimate way from a higher
priority if we cannot distinguish them from VoIP calls.
7.1 Contributions of Part III
We propose a classiﬁcation method for Skype encrypted traﬃc based on the Sta-
tistical Protocol IDentiﬁcation (SPID) [22] that analyzes statistical values of ﬂow
and application layer data. We propose an appropriate set of attribute meters to de-
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tect encrypted TCP Skype traﬃc and identify its service ﬂows. We consider a very
special case of Skype traﬃc that is, in addition to proprietary encryption, tunneled
over SSL. Our method involves three phases with progressive identiﬁcation: the ﬁrst
classiﬁcation phase early reveals Skype traﬃc, while the second one provides the
preliminary Skype ﬂows identiﬁcation: the distinction between voice/video commu-
nication, chat, voice calls towards phones using skypeOut, and ﬁle sharing. The
ﬁnal phase identiﬁes Skype ﬂows in detail: voice calls, video and voice communi-
cation (denoted later as just video), chat service, skypeOut calls, ﬁle upload and
download. To select the right attribute meters for each phase, we applied a method
called forward selection [55] that evaluates how a given attribute meter improves
classiﬁcation performance and promotes it to the traﬃc model if its inﬂuence is sig-
niﬁcant. Forward selection uses the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) [59]. We have
evaluated our classiﬁcation method on a representative dataset to show excellent
performance in terms of Precision and Recall.
7.2 Relevant Publications for Part III
[23] Maciej Korczyn´ski and Andrzej Duda. Classifying Service Flows in the En-
crypted Skype Traﬃc. 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communica-
tions (ICC’12), pages 1–5, June 2012.
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Issues in the Analysis of Skype
Traffic
Skype traﬃc presents a major challenge for detection and classiﬁcation, because
of proprietary software, several internal obfuscation mechanisms, and a complex
connection protocol designed for bypassing ﬁrewalls and establishing communication
regardless of network policies.
Skype diﬀers from other VoIP applications, because it relies on a p2p infrastruc-
ture while other applications use the traditional client-server model. Skype nodes
include clients (ordinary nodes), supernodes, and servers for updates and authenti-
cation. An ordinary node with a public IP address, suﬃcient computing resources
and network bandwidth may become a supernode. Supernodes maintain an overlay
network, while ordinary nodes establish connections with a small number of supern-
odes. Authentication servers store the user account information. A Skype client
communicates with the authentication server and another ordinary node in an in-
direct way via supernodes that relay packets. Skype can multiplex diﬀerent service
ﬂows such as voice calls to another Skype node, skypeOut calls to phones, video
conferencing, chat, ﬁle upload and download. Our goal is to detect and classify the
service ﬂows in Skype traﬃc.
Even if the maintenance of the supernode list is possible through some active
and passive methods [31], the associated information may only be useful in revealing
Skype traﬃc and not in detecting Skype service ﬂows. We cannot use traditional
port-based ﬂow identiﬁcation methods, because Skype randomly selects ports and
switches to port 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTP over SSL) if it fails to establish a
connection on chosen ports.
Another feature of the Skype design is the possibility of using both TCP and
UDP as a transport protocol. Skype uses TCP to establish a connection and then it
can switch to UDP for both signaling and regular communication. Once it makes the
initial connection, it can interchangeably use TCP or UDP depending on network
restrictions.
Skype encrypts its traﬃc with the proprietary encryption technologies to protect
60 Chapter 8. Issues in the Analysis of Skype Traffic
communications exchanged between its clients and severs. It uses several encryption
algorithms [93], which makes traﬃc classiﬁcation a challenging task. Its servers
use the strong 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the supernodes and
clients use three diﬀerent types of Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) encryption. Finally,
the clients also use AES-256 on top of RC4 algorithm to protect from potential
eavesdropping. Skype entirely encrypts TCP traﬃc, but some information in the
UDP payload is not encrypted so a part of the Skype messages encapsulated in
UDP can be obtained and used for identiﬁcation [18].
We propose an accurate method for classiﬁcation of encrypted TCP Skype ser-
vice ﬂows tunneled over SSL. It is a hybrid method combining traﬃc ﬂow metering
with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) elements.
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9.1.1 Classification Based on SPID
We build our method upon SPID (Statistical Protocol IDentiﬁcation) [22] (cf.
Figure 9.1). It is based on traffic models that contain a set of attribute fingerprints
represented as probability distributions. They are created through frequency anal-
ysis of traﬃc properties called attribute meters of application layer data or ﬂow
features. An example of such an attribute meter is byte frequency that measures
the frequency at which all of the possible 256 values occur in a packet. Other at-
tribute meters deﬁned later in Table 9.1 and 9.2 include for instance byte oﬀset,
byte re-occurring, direction change, and packet size.
As illustrated in Figure 9.1, SPID operates in three steps. First, packets are
classiﬁed into bi-directional ﬂows. All connections are represented as 5-tuples ac-
cording to the source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination
port, and transport layer protocol. However, only packets carrying data are sig-
niﬁcant, because the analysis is based on both the application layer data and ﬂow
features. Then, each ﬂow is analyzed in terms of attribute meters to obtain a collec-
tion of attribute ﬁngerprints. Finally, the obtained attribute ﬁngerprints are used
either in traﬃc model generation or in traﬃc classiﬁcation.
To illustrate the process of ﬁngerprint creation, consider an example of the
byte frequency attribute meter computed on the ﬁrst 5 bytes of the SSL Server
Hello packet, a part of the SSL handshake protocol. The ﬁrst 3 bytes refer to
the message type (0x16) and the SSL version (0x03 01), while the last two bytes
correspond to the size of the remaining part of the SSL record (0x00 4a). Each time
we observe a particular value, its counter is incremented. In the example, all ﬁve
counters referring to the ﬁve values will be incremented. Then, SPID maintains a
probability vector—the normalized counter vector with all elements summing up to
one.
At the initial training phase, the method creates traffic models—attribute ﬁn-
gerprints representative for the traﬃc we want to detect. During the classiﬁcation
phase, the method computes attribute ﬁngerprints on the ﬂows to classify and com-
pares them with traﬃc models by means of the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence
[28]:
D(P ||Q) = K-L(P,Q) =
∑
x∈X
P (x)log2
P (x)
Q(x)
. (9.1)
The K-L divergence is a measure of the diﬀerence between two probability dis-
tributions P (x) and Q(x). P (x) represents the distribution of a particular attribute
of an observed ﬂow and Q(x) is the distribution corresponding to a known traﬃc
model. Classiﬁcation consists of comparing P (x) with all known traﬃc models and
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selecting the protocol with the smallest average divergence D(P ||Q) and lower than
a given threshold. We need to correctly set the divergence threshold to decrease
the False Positive Rate for known traﬃc models—we only take into consideration
the K-L divergence average values below the threshold.
Figure 9.2 presents a simpliﬁed process of the proposed classiﬁcation method. In
the ﬁrst phase, it detects Skype traﬃc after a TCP three-way handshake based on
the ﬁrst ﬁve packets of the connection by considering attribute meters, the majority
of which reﬂects application level data. Then, it changes the set of attribute meters
to both packet independent and application level data features to detect service
ﬂows in the Skype traﬃc: voice/video, skypeOut, chat, and ﬁle transfer. This
phase requires a larger number of packets to analyze to be eﬀective: our calibration
sets this value to 450 packets. Finally, the method considers more packets (the
threshold is set to 760) to further distinguish between voice and video ﬂows, and
between ﬁle upload and download.
9.1.2 Attribute Meters for Skype
In this subsection, we present the set of attribute meters deﬁned for classifying
Skype traﬃc (cf. Table 9.1 and 9.2) with notation presented in Table 9.3.
• byte frequency: in each packet it measures and returns the frequency of indi-
vidual bytes in the payload. Encrypted data seems to have equally distributed
byte frequencies, whereas the plain text may exhibit diﬀerent distributions.
The SSL protocol, in the ﬁrst bytes of the transmitted packets, tends to pro-
vide some unencrypted information related to the session, such as the SSL
version, message type, compression method selected by the server, etc.
• action-reaction of first bytes: it creates hash values based on the ﬁrst 3
bytes of each packet that was sent in a diﬀerent direction than the previous
one. It is sometimes better to analyze packets sent alternately in diﬀerent
directions instead of looking at all packets, because we can easily analyze the
request-response phase between a client and a server.
• byte value offset hash: it combines individual byte values in each packet
with the oﬀset at which the bytes are positioned. The meter considers up
to 32 bytes of the 4 ﬁrst packets. The SSL is one of the protocols that use
several positions in particular packets (e.g. in Client Hello or Server Hello
messages). As a result, the combination of bytes with their positions provides
some additional information with respect to the byte frequency.
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Table 9.1: Deﬁnition of attribute meters used in classiﬁcation
Attribute meter Deﬁnition
byte frequency M1 : {(k, pk)}, k = 0, 1, ..., 255; pk =
mk∑
mk
, mk =
∑8
i=1
∑100
j=1 δxij
action-reaction of ﬁrst 3
bytes
M2 : {(h
i, phi), ∀i∈(1,3)}, h : (y
i
3∆, z
i
3∆)→ h(y
i
3∆, z
i
3∆),
phi =
m
hi∑
m
hi
, mhi = δh(yi
3∆
,zi
3∆
)
byte value oﬀset hash M3 : {(h, ph)}, h : (j, x
i
j)→ h(j, x
i
j), ph =
mh∑
mh
,
mh =
∑4
i=1
∑32
j=1 δh(j,xij)
ﬁrst 4 packets byte re-
occurring distance with
M4 : {(h, ph)}, ∀d<=16 : h : (x
i
j , d)→ h(x
i
j , d), ph =
mh∑
mh
,
byte mh =
∑4
i=1
∑32
j=1 δh(xij ,d)
)
ﬁrst 4 packets ﬁrst 16
byte pairs
M5 : {(h, ph)}, h : (x
i
j , x
i
j+1)→ h(x
i
j , x
i
j+1), ph =
mh∑
mh
,
mh =
∑4
i=1
∑16
j=1 δh(xij ,xij+1)
ﬁrst 4 ordered direction
packet size
M6 : {(f, pf )}, f : (i, s(x
i), dir(xi))→ f(i, s(xi), dir(xi)),
pf =
mf∑
mf
, mf =
∑4
i=1 δf(i,s(xi),dir(xi))
ﬁrst packet per direc-
tion ﬁrst N byte nibbles
M7 : {(f, pf )}, ∀x1∈{z1,y1} : f : (nib(x
1
j ), j, dir(x
1))
→ f(nib(x1j ), j, dir(x
1)),
pf =
mf∑
mf
, mf =
∑8
j=1 δf(nib(x1j ),j,dir(x1))
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Table 9.2: Deﬁnition of attribute meters used in classiﬁcation - cont.
Attribute meter Deﬁnition
direction packet size
distribution
M8 : {(f, pf )}, f : (s(x
i), dir(xi))→ f(s(xi), dir(xi)), pf =
mf∑
mf
,
mf =
∑s(x)
i=1 δf(s(xi),dir(xi))
byte pairs reoccurring
count
M9 : {(f, pf )},
∀
xij=x
i+1
j
: f : (xij , dir(x
i
j), dir(x
i+1
j ))→ f(x
i
j , dir(x
i
j), dir(x
i+1
j )),
pf =
mf∑
mf
, mf =
∑s(x)
i=1
∑32
j=1 δf(xij ,dir(xij),dir(x
i+1
j ))
• first 4 packets byte reoccurring distance with byte: it creates a short
hash value (usually a 4-bit representation) and combines it with the distance
between the two occurrences. The measurement detects the bytes that oc-
curred more than once within 16 previous bytes. Originally, it was created to
identify banners in plain text packets like e.g. TT in HTTP GET and POST
messages, but it also applies to the case of the encrypted or the tunneled SSL
content.
• first 4 packets first 16 byte pairs: it combines neighboring bytes in a
16-bit value and converts to a 8 bit hash value (the size is determined by the
ﬁngerprint length). It analyzes only application layer data regardless of the
ﬂow information, i.e. packet size, directions, or inter-arrival times. The meter
indicates that there are some speciﬁc, not random two-byte combinations like
e.g. list compression methods supported by the client in the SSL Client
Hello message sent to the server.
• first 4 ordered direction packet size: the meter returns the compressed
version of the packet size—it represents a range in which the packet lies instead
of the exact value. Measurements are separately done for each of four ﬁrst
packets in connection and the returned value is associated with the packet
direction and the order number. It is a ﬂow based attribute created for early
traﬃc recognition.
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Table 9.3: Notation
M : {(k, pk)} – attribute meter
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 255 – random variable of an attribute meter
mk – attribute meter counter
pk – probability distribution of an attribute meter (corresponds to Q(x) in traﬃc
model generation and P (x) in traﬃc classiﬁcation)
δ – indicator function; δ : X → {0, 1}, δxij
=
{
1 if X = xij
0 if X 6= xij
h – hash function, h = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 255
f – compressing function, f = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 255
xi – packet i
xij – byte j in packet i
xi
j(m) – bit m in byte j in packet i∑
i x
i ↔ x – all packets in a TCP session
yi – packet i, zi – packet sent in a diﬀerent direction than yi
xi∆j – ﬁrst j bytes in packet i
d – distance between two identical bytes; if xij = x
i
j−d ⇒ d, 0 < d < j
s(x) – size of x; amount of packets in a TCP session
s(xi) – size of packet xi in bytes
dir – packet direction
nib: xij ↔ x
i
j(m∈(1...8)); x
i
j(m∈(1...4)) XOR x
i
j(m∈(5...8) ⇒ nib(x
i
j)
• first packet per direction first N byte nibbles: it analyzes the ﬁrst
packet in each direction and inspects its ﬁrst few bytes depending on the ﬁn-
gerprint length (8 bytes for a ﬁngerprint length of 256). It provides a measure
combining the packet direction, byte oﬀset, and a compact representation of
the byte value so-called nibble, (it divides a byte into two 4-bit groups, per-
forms an XOR calculation, and returns the resulting 4-bit value). The ﬁrst
packet in each direction and the ﬁrst few bytes corresponding to these packets
say a lot about the application layer protocol and might also provide some
hidden information of the underlying service.
• direction packet size distribution: this attribute is very similar to the
ﬁrst 4 ordered direction packet size meter. The only diﬀerence is that it
inspects all packets in a connection and does not mark each measurement
with the order number of the packet in a connection. It is an example of a
ﬂow based attribute especially suitable for detailed Skype classiﬁcation: it is
able to classify ﬂows in which packet sizes per direction are diﬀerent, which
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enables to distinguish, for example, ﬁle upload from download.
• byte pairs reoccurring count: it detects bytes that reoccur in the same
position in two consecutive packets. In addition, it takes into account the
direction of a given packet and its predecessor.
9.1.3 Methodology for Attribute Meter Selection
Our classiﬁcation process is based on three phases and each of them requires a
proper set of attribute meters. We applied a method called forward selection for
choosing attribute meters. It consists of starting with an initial attribute in the
model, trying attributes out one by one, and adopting them, if they improve the
classiﬁcation performance. The selection terminates when adding an attribute does
not improve the performance.
We consider a set of n attribute meters x1, ..., xn ∈ X and a set of m Skype
services. We begin with a model that includes the most signiﬁcant attribute in the
initial analysis. More precisely, we compute Precision, Recall, and F -Measure
(cf. Eq. 3.2 - 3.4) for a particular Skype service and for each individual attribute
meter. The True Positive (TP) term refers to all Skype ﬂows that are correctly
identiﬁed, False Positives (FPs) refer to all ﬂows that were incorrectly identiﬁed as
Skype traﬃc. Finally, False Negatives (FNs) represent all ﬂows of Skype traﬃc that
were incorrectly identiﬁed as other traﬃc.
We select attribute xi ∈ X with the largest average F -Measure deﬁned as:
max
x∈X
1
m
∑
a∈(1,m)
FMxa , (9.2)
where FMxa denotes a
th observation of F -Measure value corresponding to xth at-
tribute meter.
In the next step, each of the remaining attributes x1, ...xi−1, xi+1, ...xn ∈ X is
tested for inclusion in the model. We run several F -tests (explained below) that
compare the variance of F -Measure values obtained in the preliminary selection,
i.e. FMxia , where a ∈ (1,m), with the corresponding values obtained after including
each attribute meter separately.
Let us focus on a particular F -test [59] that compares the inﬂuence of attribute
meter xj ∈ x1, ...xi−1, xi+1, ...xn ∈ X with the ﬁrst model based on xi ∈ X. We
examine two groups of F -Measure values FMxia and FM
xij
a that respectively cor-
respond to attribute xi and to the set of two attribute meters, i.e. xi and xj . We
test the null hypothesis that two means of the discussed population are equal. If we
fail to reject it, the additional attribute meter does not improve the classiﬁcation
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performance and we need to exclude it from further consideration. To examine
these two groups, we use the one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) F -test [59]
that compares the variance between the groups to the variance within the groups.
The between–groups variance is given by:
Sbet = m ∗
∑
x
(FM
x
− FM)2
(k − 1)
, (9.3)
where FM
x
denotes the mean of FMxa values, FM denotes the overall mean of
F -Measure observations, i.e. FMxia and FM
xij
a , m is the number of F -Measure
values for Skype services and k is the number of groups (in the discussed case equal
to 2). The within–group variance is given by:
Swit =
∑
x,a
(FMxa − FM
x
)2
k ∗ (m− 1)
, (9.4)
where FMxa denotes a
th observation corresponding to each xth classiﬁcation (in the
discussed case to the classiﬁcation based on xi and the classiﬁcation based on the
set of two attributes xi and xj).
The F -statistics is computed as:
F =
Sbet
Swit
, (9.5)
and it follows the F -distribution with k−1, k∗(m−1) degrees of freedom under the
null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis is rejected and the average F -Measure value
corresponding to xi is lower than F -Measure related to the set of two attribute
meters, i.e. xi and xj , then attribute xj is considered as a candidate to be included
in the model.
For each of the attribute meters, the method computes F -statistics that reﬂects
the contribution of attributes to the model. The most signiﬁcant attribute is added
to the model, if F -statistics is above a predeﬁned level set to 0.1. Moreover, if
F -statistics is above 1, it is included in the model and considered as a signiﬁcant
attribute meter. The forward selection method then computes F -statistics again
for the attribute meters still remaining outside the model and the evaluation process
repeats. Therefore, attributes are added one by one to the model until no remaining
attribute results in signiﬁcant F -statistics.
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9.2 Evaluation Results
We start with the description of the datasets used for training the method and
evaluating its performance. We then present the criteria for classiﬁcation perfor-
mance and we discuss the evaluation results of the proposed method. We also
explain how we calibrate the parameters of the method (the choice of the number
of packets to analyze during each step, the number of ﬂows used in the training
process, and the selection of the right K-L threshold).
9.2.1 Dataset Description
The appropriate selection of packet traces containing ground-truth information
is one of the key aspects in the training and evaluation process. It should be as
extensive as possible and should cover various environments. We have generated
TCP Skype traﬃc in the following conditions:
• various operating systems: Linux, MacOS, Windows,
• wireless and wired networks,
• connections within one LAN as well as WAN connections between LANs lo-
cated in France and Poland,
• diﬀerent versions of Skype (2, 3, and 5)
To force Skype to generate desired ﬂows, we have used ﬁrewall rules to block
UDP so that all communications use TCP and allowed only well-known TCP ports
so that Skype switches to port 443.
We have used Wireshark [94] to collect packet traces and to distinguish Skype
ﬂows from other network traﬃc. We have tested all Skype services separately to
simplify the extraction of the desired ﬂows and captured ﬂows containing voice,
video, skypeOut, chat, ﬁle upload and download. We have observed the use of the
G.729 codec for skypeOut calls and SILK V3 for Skype-to-Skype voice communi-
cation. Skype adopts VP7.1 codec for video communication. Overall, we gathered
479 Skype ﬂow traces taking more than 770 MB.
Therefore, we have divided the collected set of ﬂows into several groups accord-
ing to operating systems, network access technologies, and Skype versions. For
the traﬃc model generation purpose we have selected a group of traces generated
by MacOS over a WAN connection between wireless LANs located in France and
Poland. We have used the remaining datasets to evaluate the classiﬁcation mech-
anism. Our ﬁngerprint database with 6 Skype service ﬂow models has the size of
1.78MB in the XML format.
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Furthermore, we have gathered a separate set of traces without Skype traﬃc
to test the discrimination of our method. It contains various types of traﬃc: SSL,
SSH, HTTP, SCP, SFTP, VoIP, BitTorrent, and standard services like streaming,
video conferencing, chat service, mail, ﬁle sharing. The traces contain 18945 ﬂows
of around 3GB and were gathered between December 2010 and March 2011.
9.2.2 Criteria for Classification Performance
We use three metrics to quantify the performance of classiﬁcation: Precision,
Recall, and F -Measure (cf. Eq. 3.3 - 3.4). F -Measure is an evenly weighted
combination between Precision and Recall, which means that if the system can
for instance identify skypeOut traﬃc with Precision 100% (no False Positives) and
Recall is 96.6% then the F -Measure is 98.2%.
9.2.3 Performance of Classification
To evaluate the proposed method, we have extended the version 0.4.6 of SPID
[95].
Our method depends on three parameters: the amount of packets required for
reliable traﬃc and ﬂow identiﬁcation during each of the three steps, the K-L di-
vergence threshold, and the number of ﬂows used in the training process. We ﬁrst
present the classiﬁcation results for the number of packets in each phase set to
5, 450, and 760 packets, respectively, the K-L divergence threshold of 1.9, and 15
training ﬂows (we evaluate the impact of parameters further on and explain how
we have chosen their values, cf. Section 9.3).
After each classiﬁcation step, the classiﬁer decides if there are any instances
of Skype ﬂow for further analysis. If the identiﬁcation result is positive, then it
continues with more detailed classiﬁcation of Skype ﬂows with a diﬀerent set of
attribute meters. Otherwise, it ﬁnishes as no Skype ﬂows were recognized.
The objective of the ﬁrst classiﬁcation phase is to early detect encrypted TCP
Skype ﬂows tunneled over the SSL protocol. The most signiﬁcant attribute meter
chosen in the selection process is M5 (cf. Table 9.1). Two other important at-
tributes are M7 and M6 while M3, M4, and M1 are less meaningful. In addition
to payload inspection attributes (M5,M7,M3,M4, andM1), we have chosen one
typical ﬂow based attribute that combines features like size, direction, and packet
order number (M6). Such selection indicates that the ﬁrst SSL packets contain
some characteristic values that diﬀer from the headers of other services that use
SSL (cf. Section 12.2).
Our experiments show that inspecting only the ﬁrst ﬁve packets containing the
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Table 9.4: Performance of Phase 1, Early Recognition of Skype Traﬃc
Traﬃc Precision % Recall % F-M. %
Skype 100 100 100
No Skype 100 100 100
payload is suﬃcient to reveal Skype traﬃc with Precision, Recall, and F-Measure
equal to 100% (cf. Table 9.4).
Once the method detects Skype traﬃc, it classiﬁes the underlying type of service,
i.e. voice/video communication, skypeOut calls, chat, ﬁle sharing. In the second
phase, the method uses another set of attribute meters (M8 as the most important,
M7 as a signiﬁcant one, andM9,M2, andM5 as additional ones). The selected set
of attributes is composed of payload independent direction packet size distribution
attribute meter (M8) with DPI attributes (M7, M9, M2, and M5).
Table 9.5: Performance of Phase 2, Classiﬁcation of Skype Flows
Skype Service Precision % Recall % F-M. %
voice/video 99.1 95.7 97.4
skypeOut 100 96.6 98.2
chat 86.4 100 92.7
ﬁle sharing 100 98.6 99.3
Table 9.5 shows very good results of classiﬁcation after inspecting 450 pack-
ets. However, this phase cannot distinguish between voice communications and
voice/video calls due to similar traﬃc characteristics. Nevertheless, from the Qual-
ity of Service (QoS) perspective, network administrators may already give priority
to Skype voice/video traﬃc and limit Skype ﬁle sharing ﬂows regardless of the
traﬃc direction.
The objective of Phase 3 is to further reﬁne the classiﬁcation of voice and video
ﬂows as well as ﬁle sharing. We have appliedM8 as the most important ﬂow based
attribute meter and DPI based M7 as an additional one. Table 9.6 presents the
ﬁnal results obtained after analyzing 760 packets. We can observe that the results
are very good for most of Skype ﬂows. We can easily distinguish between ﬁle upload
and download based on the ﬂow attribute combining the direction with the packet
size distribution (cf. attribute M8 in Table 9.2). The classiﬁcation is based on the
fact that the sizes of packets sent from the client signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the sizes
of packets sent in the opposite direction.
Classiﬁcation of voice and video ﬂows performs slightly worse, because our
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Table 9.6: Performance of Phase 3, Detailed Classiﬁcation of Skype Flows
Skype Service Precision % Recall % F–M. %
voice 72.9 57.4 64.2
video 60.3 73.2 66.1
skypeOut 100 96.6 98.2
chat 90.2 97.4 93.7
ﬁle upload 100 96.9 98.4
ﬁle download 100 97.5 98.7
method does not capture some characteristics of the Skype behavior (it is meant
to be applied to other classiﬁcation problems as well). We have observed that in
the case of Skype calls (both voice and video), the Skype client sends traﬃc simul-
taneously through several nodes depending on network conditions. In other words,
the Skype voice or video traﬃc may spread on several TCP connections, which we
cannot capture, because our method considers each TCP ﬂow separately.
In contrast to voice/video communication and ﬁle sharing, we have noticed
that chat messages and skypeOut calls seem to be sent through a single node.
Considering chat messages, we have observed that when an intermediary node goes
down, communication switches to another one without any interference for the
users. This is not surprising if we take into account a small amount of data to send.
For skypeOut calls, however, we have observed that the whole communication goes
through a single intermediary node and the range of relay addresses is limited.
This may come from higher requirements for bandwidth and computing resources
to support high quality of calls. To sum up, in this classiﬁcation step it was easier
to identify these two type of services, because the whole traﬃc was sent over single
ﬂows.
9.3 Calibration of the Method
In this section, we consider the choice of the right values for the mathod param-
eters:
• the K-L divergence threshold,
• the number of inspected packets per ﬂow in each classiﬁcation phase,
• the number of ﬂows used in the training process.
Figure 9.3 shows the F-Measure for 15 training ﬂows and for three classiﬁcation
steps (analysis after 5, 450, and 760 packets) depending on the K-L divergence
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Figure 9.3: F-Measure depending on the K-L divergence threshold for three
classiﬁcation phases.
threshold. Choosing an appropriate value of K-L divergence threshold is important
because a too low value results in an increased number of False Negatives, i.e. Skype
ﬂows are incorrectly identiﬁed as unknown traﬃc, which decreases the F-Measure.
If the threshold is too high, then it may lead to multiple False Positives, i.e. other
protocols are incorrectly identiﬁed as Skype. As shown in Figure 9.3, a large value
of the threshold signiﬁcantly aﬀects the F-Measure. The results suggest that the
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Figure 9.4: F-Measure depending on the number of inspected packets for
three classiﬁcation phases.
optimal value for all three classiﬁcation phases is 1.9.
Figure 9.4 shows the F-Measure depending on the number of inspected packets
containing payload for three classiﬁcation phases with the K-L divergence threshold
equal to 1.9 and 15 training ﬂows per traﬃc model. As we can see in the ﬁgure, the
ﬁrst classiﬁcation phase requires only 4 packets to achieve the F–Measure equal to
100%. In the second classiﬁcation phase, the distinction between Skype services, i.e.
voice/video, skypeOut, chat, and ﬁle sharing, is very clear (the average F-Measure
close to 97%) after 450 packets containing payload. A slightly lower Precision for
the chat service when the number of inspected packets is less than 450 packets is
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Figure 9.5: F-Measure depending on the number of training ﬂows for three
classiﬁcation phases.
probably due to a limited number of observations during the construction of the
chat traﬃc model. Despite the same number of training ﬂows set up to 15 for all
traﬃc models, i.e. voice, video, chat, skypeOut, traﬃc upload and traﬃc download,
the amount of data available during the creation of the chat traﬃc model was three
times lower than in other cases. Therefore, the lower Precision for chat means
that other Skype services were incorrectly identiﬁed as chat, which results in a
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lower Recall for voice/video as well as for ﬁle sharing, while the performance for
skypeOut remains almost unaﬀected due to diﬀerent traﬃc characteristics.
In the third classiﬁcation phase, the F-Measure signiﬁcantly raises with the
number of inspected ﬂows up to around 700 packets. Choosing the number of 760
results in the F–Measure for voice and video traﬃc models around 65%, whereas
the accuracy of the classiﬁcation is nearly ideal for other types of Skype traﬃc.
Finally, Figure 9.5 presents the inﬂuence of the number of training ﬂows on the
F–Measure value for three classiﬁcation phases. We can see that the critical amount
of training ﬂows essential for identiﬁcation of the encrypted Skype traﬃc is equal
to 3. However, to improve classiﬁcation performance, we have used 15 training
sessions for each traﬃc model, because the training phase is done oﬀ line, so it does
not inﬂuence the speed of classiﬁcation.
9.4 Related Work
Much research has concerned the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation during recent
years [5, 2, 3, 26, 96], however only a few authors focused on encrypted traﬃc
[52, 25, 33, 31] or on the classiﬁcation of encrypted ﬂows [97, 18, 51, 35]. Some of
these methods were applied to the problem of Skype classiﬁcation and cannot be
easily extended to other identiﬁcation problems of encrypted traﬃc.
Teixeira et al. [52] extended their previous work [26] and proposed a method
based on the size of the ﬁrst few packets of an encrypted connection, which enables
an early application protocol recognition with the accuracy of more that 85%. In
our work, we make a step forward by proposing an accurate method for detecting
service ﬂows in encrypted Skype traﬃc based on various traﬃc ﬂow and payload
attributes.
A recent approach focused on the detection of Skype ﬂows especially voice ser-
vice traﬃc [31]. Even if the method results in high accuracy, it is not applicable to
other classiﬁcation problems, because it makes use of ﬂow features and node infor-
mation obtained from some passive and active measurements within the Skype p2p
network. The solution proposed by Alshammari et al. [33] is based on a machine
learning algorithm using ﬂow features without taking into account IP addresses,
port numbers, and the payload. It is a fairly general methodology and like for us,
Skype is a test case for the classiﬁcation of encrypted traﬃc. However, it is not
sure that the method can classify Skype ﬂow services. Another approach tries to
address the problem of identifying encrypted application layer protocols by means
of a hybrid method that combines signature-based and statistical analysis methods
[25]. The work is closely related to ours, but their objective is limited to the classiﬁ-
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cation of encrypted application layer protocols, while we focus more on an in-depth
analysis of particular Skype services. Wright et al. tackled the challenging task
of identifying the language of conversations by using the length of encrypted VoIP
packets [97]. Even if their work diﬀers from our study in terms of classiﬁcation
objectives, we believe that the conclusions may remain the same, i.e. when using
certain traﬃc characteristics it is possible to extract some meaningful information
even from encrypted traﬃc.
Bonﬁglio et al. investigated the characteristics of traﬃc streams generated by
voice and video communications as well as the signaling traﬃc generated by Skype
[51]. Chen et al. concentrated on the QoS level provided to Skype users [35]. Due to
simple classiﬁcation criteria, they cannot however distinguish between voice, video,
and skypeOut calls.
Finally, Bonﬁglio et al. proposed a framework based on two complementary
techniques [18]. The ﬁrst one detects Skype traﬃc ﬁngerprints and the second one
is based on ﬂow characteristics (the packet arrival rate and the packet size). The
authors evaluate two classiﬁers to reveal Skype traﬃc. The ﬁrst Chi-Square Clas-
siﬁer checks the characteristics of the message content after cyphering. With this
methodology, they can only distinguish between voice and skypeOut ﬂows trans-
ported over UDP based on some deterministic unencrypted bytes in Skype messages.
The second Naive Bayes Classiﬁer checks the resemblance of the measured traﬃc
with expected stochastic characteristics. Despite the fact that the framework is in-
spiring and innovative, it is limited to only classifying some classes of Skype traﬃc
and depends on the deterministic byte values in the unencrypted UDP payload. In
our studies, we have focused on TCP traﬃc where the whole content of a Skype
message is encrypted and tunneled over the SSL protocol.
To summarize, the research described above focused either on limited classiﬁ-
cation of Skype traﬃc depending on particular unencrypted payload bytes or on
some typical behavior of the Skype protocol. We believe that the problem of the
detailed classiﬁcation of encrypted traﬃc, in particular, the identiﬁcation of service
ﬂows in the encrypted Skype traﬃc has not received suﬃcient attention yet. Our
hybrid method provides a step forward in this direction.
9.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the problem of detecting encrypted TCP
Skype traﬃc tunneled over SSL and classifying Skype service ﬂows. Our three-phase
hybrid classiﬁcation method is based on SPID and combines traditional statistical
ﬂow features with DPI elements. In each phase, we select a subset of relevant
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attribute meters through forward selection based on ANOVA. The performance of
the method on a representative dataset is very promising—it achieves high Precision
and Recall for most Skype service ﬂows, whereas distinguishing between voice and
video ﬂows in the ﬁnal classiﬁcation phase is more challenging due to spreading
traﬃc on several TCP connections.
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In this thesis, we have already emphasized the importance of adequate traf-
ﬁc classiﬁcation methods for eﬀective network planning, policy-based traﬃc man-
agement, application prioritization, and security control. Traditional port-based
[14, 17, 98] and payload-based [7, 5, 99] classiﬁcation methods, however, become
less eﬃcient, because new applications begin to use sophisticated obfuscation mech-
anisms and an increased number of applications make use of encryption, e.g., Tor
[100], I2P [101], Bittorrent [102], IMule [103], Skype [93]. Applications can hide
their nature by dynamically assigning ports, by using tunneling, or by applying
proprietary payload encryption methods. This situation has led to the development
of new ﬂow feature-based [3, 52] and host behavior-based [2, 19] classiﬁcation meth-
ods. In opposition to these approaches, we propose a classiﬁcation framework that
uses two statistical, payload-based methods to accurately classify traﬃc encrypted
with the Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) protocols.
TLS/SSL is a fundamental cryptographic protocol suite that supports secure
communication over the Internet [104] by encapsulating and encrypting application
layer data. Many WWW portals and servers, especially those providing commer-
cial services, use TLS/SSL for guaranteeing security of all operations. In addition
to security, TLS/SSL tunnels are increasingly used as tools for defeating security
control and bypassing restrictions set by network conﬁguration and security checks.
Enforcing control over TLS/SSL encrypted ﬂow is diﬃcult, because the protocol
was speciﬁcally designed to prevent eavesdropping and data tampering. Thus, the
side-eﬀect of its powerful mechanisms for supporting security is the lost capability
of monitoring and controlling traﬃc.
The past research on traﬃc analysis and classiﬁcation showed that once we are
able to generate a unique signature based on the packet or message payload (e.g.,
HTTP request headers), we can classify applications with high accuracy [7, 16].
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Unfortunately, such approaches fail in case of encrypted traﬃc [13], which spawned
the development of ﬂow-based and host behavior-based approaches. Nevertheless,
recent research has also shown that it is still possible to create some statistical
signatures despite traﬃc encryption [18, 23]. We follow this approach by deﬁning a
framework for classifying TLS/SSL encrypted applications based on inspecting the
packet content of the application layer. We have found that the use of the TLS/SSL
protocol strongly depends on service and application needs so it can reﬂect some
traﬃc features, which allows us to discriminate between applications. In other
words, we extract some indirect information from the TLS/SSL layer and use it to
classify underlying applications.
10.1 Contributions of Part IV
Following these principles, we deﬁne a framework based on two complementary
methods for classifying applications. In the ﬁrst method, we use a ﬁrst-order ho-
mogeneous Markov chain to build a stochastic model reﬂecting TLS/SSL session
states. We call this method a Markov Classifier (MC). The session states represent
the TLS/SSL protocol and message types in single-directional traﬃc ﬂows (client
to server and server to client). In this way, we obtain a TLS/SSL session model per
ﬂow direction associated with each application. To the best of our knowledge, such
a method is applied for the ﬁrst time to the classiﬁcation of encrypted traﬃc. The
second method called a Timestamp Classifier (TC) considers the deviation between
the timestamp in the TLS/SSL Server Hello message and the packet arrival time.
We validate the framework with experiments on three recent datasets gathered
on two edge routers. They serve in a training phase to build application models. To
obtain the ground truth, we use a simple Domain Name System Classifier (DNSC)
that extracts application ﬂows based on the corresponding host names. We only
keep the ﬂows for which we can ﬁnd the domain names of the chosen portals and
services so we are sure that training ﬂows correspond to the considered applications.
Then, we use the proposed methods to classify chosen applications and evaluate the
amount of true positives and false positives. The chosen applications are represen-
tative of TLS/SSL encrypted traﬃc: PayPal, MBank (an on-line bank service),
Mozilla, Twitter, Opera, Gadu-Gadu (a popular Polish instant messenger), and
Dropbox.
We test the proposed classiﬁers separately or jointly on diﬀerent datasets and
we evaluate the contribution of each method to the ﬁnal classiﬁcation result. In the
case of the most heterogenous datasets used for training and in the testing phase
(the conditions favorable for the methods), we achieve very good accuracy with
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more than 92% of the True Positive Rate and less than 1.5% of the False Positive
Rate. Under adverse conditions for the methods, in the case of a less representative
training dataset, the methods obtain slightly less accurate results with the True
Positive Rate ranging from 77.7% to 80.1% and the False Positive Rate between
2.4% to 3.8%.
Our key contributions are:
• we successfully apply stochastic modeling in terms of a ﬁrst-order homoge-
neous Markov chain to the classiﬁcation of application ﬂows encrypted with
TLS/SSL;
• we propose a simple discrimination method based on the deviation between
the timestamp in the TLS/SSL Server Hello message and the packet arrival
time. The method improves the accuracy of application classiﬁcation and
allows eﬃcient identiﬁcation of Skype ﬂows;
• our experimental results show very good classiﬁcation performance on recent
datasets reﬂecting diﬀerent network environments and conditions.
10.2 Relevant Publications for Part IV
Maciej Korczyn´ski and Andrzej Duda. Classifying TLS/SSL Encrypted Applica-
tion Flows. to be submitted.
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11.1 Related Work
A lot of research eﬀort concerned traﬃc classiﬁcation [7, 5, 99, 3, 52, 2, 19, 16,
13, 25, 96]. Recent attention has turned to the problem of revealing and identifying
encrypted applications and their underlying ﬂows [18, 23]. We brieﬂy review this
recent work.
As new Internet applications started to use obfuscation methods (port mas-
querading, tunneling, and encryption) to evade traﬃc control and restrictions, sim-
ple inspection of port numbers is no longer a reliable classiﬁcation mechanism [5, 15]
(cf. Section 3.3.1). Moreover, payload encryption easily thwarts traditional payload-
based classiﬁcation based on pattern matching. Host behavior-based approaches
[2, 19] (cf. Section 3.3.3) can potentially address the ineﬃciency of content-based
methods. BLINC for example, proposes an interesting method based on observing
and recognizing models of host behavior and then classifying its ﬂows according to
the models [2]. However, the method might be less eﬀective when only a small part
of behavioral information on individual hosts is available.
The second fundamentally diﬀerent group of payload-independent approaches
use ﬂow-based features such as average packet sizes, packets inter-arrival times,
or ﬂow durations [3, 52, 25] (cf. Section 3.3.4). A recent hybrid method tries to
identify TLS/SSL encrypted application layer protocols with a combination of a
signature-based and a ﬂow-based statistical analysis scheme [25]. The method is
closely related to our proposal, however its objective is limited to the classiﬁcation
88 Chapter 11. Background on Encrypted Traffic Classification
of encrypted application layer protocols, while we concentrate more on an in-depth
analysis of the TLS/SSL protocol and revealing application ﬂows.
In our work, we adopt a payload-based approach (cf. Section 3.3.2) to demon-
strate that it is possible to eﬀectively reveal and classify application ﬂows by in-
specting application layer protocols. Risso et al. introduced a taxonomy of payload-
based classiﬁcation methods [13] and argued that they are mainly based on pattern
verification. A key challenge in encrypted traﬃc classiﬁcation is to replace tra-
ditional pattern verification with more sophisticated methods based on statistical
fingerprints, for instance, by identifying groups of bits or bytes that exhibit unique
distributions. Indeed, few researchers attempted to create such statistical finger-
prints [18, 22, 23]. Bonﬁglio et al. in their inspiring work have investigated Skype
traﬃc transported mainly by UDP [18]. Skype traﬃc presents a major challenge
for classiﬁcation, because of proprietary software and internal encryption methods
(cf. Chapter 8). However, they concluded that the Skype messages can be iden-
tiﬁed by examining the initial portion of the payload—so-called Start of Message
(SoM). Speciﬁcally, authors examine randomness of initial groups of bits by means
of a Chi-Square test. Some blocks of bits are random, whereas some other appear
to be deterministic or mixed. While their innovative approach can be successfully
extended to other traﬃc classiﬁcation problems, the method depends on the obser-
vation of speciﬁc ﬁelds in the proprietary Skype protocol. Our method applies to a
general case of the standard TLS/SSL encryption protocol.
In our previous work [23] (cf. Part III), we have considered the problem of
detecting encrypted TCP Skype traﬃc tunneled over SSL and classifying Skype
service ﬂows such as voice calls, skypeOut, video conferencing, chat, ﬁle upload and
download. The initial classiﬁcation phase is based on Statistical Protocol IDenti-
ﬁcation (SPID) algorithm [22] that analyzes some statistical values of the packet
payload. Our experiments showed that inspecting only the ﬁrst ﬁve packets con-
taining the payload is suﬃcient to reveal encrypted TCP Skype ﬂows tunneled over
SSL with Precision, Recall, and F-Measure equal to 100%.
11.2 TLS/SSL Overview
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS)
are cryptographic protocols that provide secure communication between two parties
over the Internet [104]. They encapsulate application protocols such as HTTP or
FTP.
Figure 11.1 illustrates the structure of TLS/SSL and its components:
• Record Protocol : compresses and encrypts upper-layer data using the security
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In this chapter, we use the principles of TLS/SSL protocol design to classify en-
crypted applications. In particular, we propose two classiﬁers that exploit diﬀerent
aspects and characteristics derived from TLS/SSL messages.
12.1 Markov Classifier
Our Markov Classifier (MC) takes into account message types in a TLS/SSL
session observed at a client or a server: we refer to the server-side MC as MCS
and to the client-side MC as MCC. Depending on the network environment, we
expect slightly diﬀerent characteristics for the client side, whereas the service-side
model should be representative of all networks. Moreover, the separation of client-
and server-side classiﬁers helps tackling the problem of asymmetric routing (if a
network has two edge routers, routes may be asymmetric so each router can only
gather information on a ﬂow in one direction).
We use the following compact notation of messages types—the decimal protocol
types and the Handshake message types present in TLS/SSL headers (cf. Figure
12.1).
To deﬁne the state space used in classiﬁcation based on ﬁrst-order homogeneous
Markov chain, let us consider again the message exchange presented in the previous
section (cf. Figure 11.2). This time, however, we will translate the client-server
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protocol types remain visible, because the message types are encrypted. There-
fore, we cannot extract either handshake Finished message (represented as 22:) or
underlying type of Alert protocol (represented as 21:). To summarize, from the
diagram presented in Figure 12.2 we can distinguish one Markov chain per direc-
tion representing the underlying application. The client-side session, corresponding
to MCC classiﬁcation, is composed of two states, whereas the server-side session,
associated with MCS classiﬁcation, consist of ﬁve states.
We consider discrete-time random variable Xt for any t = t0, t1, ..., tn ∈ T . It
takes values it ∈ {1, ..., s} corresponding to the observed TLS/SSL message types
during a session. We assume that Xt is a ﬁrst-order Markov chain [105, 29]:
P (Xt = it|Xt−1 = it−1, Xt−2 = it−2, . . . , X0 = i0)
= P (Xt = it|Xt−1 = it−1). (12.1)
We further assume that the Markov chain is homogeneous, i.e. a state transition
from time t− 1 to time t is time-invariant:
P (Xt = it|Xt−1 = it−1) = P (Xt = j|Xt−1 = i) = pi,j , (12.2)
with the transition matrix [105, 29]:
P =


p1,1 p1,2 · · · p1,s
p2,1 p2,2 · · · p2,s
...
...
. . .
...
ps,1 ps,2 · · · ps,s

 , (12.3)
where:
∑s
j=1 pi,j = 1. We denote by:
Q = [q1, q2, . . . , qs], (12.4)
the Initial Probability Distribution (IPD) where qi = P (Xt = i) at time t = 0.
Finally, the probability that a sequence of states X1, . . . , XT representing a
single TLS/SSL session occurs is as follows:
P ({X1, . . . , XT }) = qi ∗
T∏
t=2
pit−1,it . (12.5)
To illustrate our approach, we present the observed transition probability ma-
trices and the initial probability distributions of the MCS models for selected ap-
plications.
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Actually, Skype is a proprietary piece of software that uses its own internal
encryption mechanisms and a complex connection protocol designed for bypassing
ﬁrewalls and establishing communication regardless of network policies [92, 93, 23].
Skype randomly selects ports and can switch to port 443 if it fails to establish a
connection on chosen ports (cf. Chapter 8). Such technique is suﬃcient to bypass
network-layer ﬁrewalls, however, it results in establishing a particular TLS/SSL
session.
Table 12.1: Number of non-zero transition matrix elements for diﬀerent ap-
plications
Application
# training ﬂows # transition
(# servers) matrix elements
Gadu-Gadu 1196 (51) 63
MBank 2665 (3) 29
Opera 4357 (13) 26
PayPal 434 (6) 16
Mozilla 2669 (21) 38
Twitter 1530 (13) 36
Dropbox 3134 (317) 43
12.1.2 Discussion
The most important conclusion that we can draw from the examples is that the
parameters of the Markov models for chosen applications diﬀer a lot, which is the
basis for accurate discrimination between applications. We have also found that the
number of transition matrix elements in each application model signiﬁcantly diﬀer.
Table 12.1 presents the number of non-zero elements in the transition matrix, the
number of training sessions, and the number of servers that generated them, in the
most representative Campus2 dataset.
12.1.3 Training Phase
To build the Markov models representing the applications behavior, our classi-
ﬁer needs a training phase during which it analyzes ground-truth data containing
application ﬂows. The classiﬁer analyzes traces pre-processed and ﬁltered out by
tshark [106] so that only TLS/SSL encrypted packets are passed to further inspec-
tion. Then, it uses the DNSC classiﬁcation to create a benchmark dataset in which
application ﬂows are identiﬁed with a high conﬁdence level (cf. Section 13.1.1). The
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classiﬁer only considers a limited number of ﬁelds—it ﬁrst extracts the IP source
and destination addresses, the source and destination ports to create unique iden-
tiﬁers of each session. Further, it builds 14 single-directional models corresponding
to 7 chosen applications based on all unencrypted TLS/SSL protocol and message
types.
12.1.4 Classification Phase
The classiﬁer ﬁrst pre-process the test dataset to extract application ﬂows and
then applies a decision process based on the Maximum Likelihood criterion [107].
Classiﬁcation corresponds to a multi-hypothesis decision problem. More speciﬁcally,
we consider seven hypothesis Hi, i = 1, . . . , 7 corresponding to each of seven appli-
cations. We apply a classical approach based on Maximum Likelihood criterion—we
select the hypothesis under which the data sequence Y is most likely:
H = argmax
Hi
logL({Y1, . . . , YT }|Hi), (12.6)
where L({Y1, . . . , YT }) is the likelihood of the input data sequence under each
hypothesis: L({Y1, . . . , YT }) ≡ P ({X1, . . . , XT }) (cf. Eq. 12.5) is the probability of
a message sequence computed over each of the application models.
12.2 Timestamp Classifier
The second classiﬁer analyzes the probability distribution of the gmt unix time
ﬁeld in the TLS/SSL Server Hello message. The initial handshake Client Hello
and Server Hello messages include a random structure used later in encryption
composed of two ﬁelds: gmt unix time (4 bytes) and random bytes (28 bytes) [104].
Depending on applications, the gmt unix time ﬁeld contains diﬀerent timestamps:
the current time and date set by the sender clock, a random sequence of 32 bits, or
a constant value, and in particular, 0.
The Timestamp Classiﬁer extracts the gmt unix time timestamp from the Server
Hello message and the packet reception instant from the capture ﬁle. It keeps only
the ﬁrst 3 most signiﬁcant bytes of the value to neglect possible small time diﬀer-
ences between the sender and the device that captures packets. 3 bytes are consid-
ered separately as integer values. More formally, let us deﬁne Xi, Yi ∈ 0, . . . , 255
as random variables of possible values of byte i ∈ 1, 2, 3 of the gmt unix time ﬁeld
and the packet reception timestamp, respectively. δi = |Xi − Yi|, is a deviation
measure between the gmt unix time ﬁeld and the corresponding packet timestamp.
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Table 12.2: Content characteristics of the gmt unix time ﬁeld
gmt unix time δi
Current time Const (= 0)
Random Rnd
Deterministic Const
The relationship between gmt unix time ﬁeld and δi is summarized in Table 12.2:
we expect obtained ﬁngerprints to present random or deterministic distributions
depending on the application.
At the initial training phase, the method creates statistical ﬁngerprints of the
timestamp deviation for each application traﬃc. During the classiﬁcation phase,
the method computes the deviation and compares with the traﬃc models by means
of the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence [28]:
D(P ||Q) = K-L(P,Q) =
∑
δi∈0,...,255
P (δi)log2
P (δi)
Q(δi)
. (12.7)
The K-L divergence is a measure of the diﬀerence between two probability dis-
tributions P (δi) and Q(δi). P (δi) represents the distribution of the byte frequency
of δi in an observed ﬂow and Q(δi) is the distribution corresponding to one of seven
application models. Classiﬁcation consists of comparing P (δi) with all known ap-
plication models and selecting the one with the smallest average divergence. When
TC is a part of the classiﬁcation framework explained in Section 12.3, then we con-
sider probability distributions Q(δi), where δi refers to the analyzed session for all
application models.
After the analysis ofQ(δi) for seven chosen applications over the Campus2 dataset
and for Skype over the Skype dataset, we have observed four groups of applications.
The largest group represented by Gadu-Gadu, Mozilla, Twitter, and Dropbox,
has the same Q(δi) distribution determined by the current time. Another group con-
tains PayPal with a uniform distribution. The Q(δi) distributions of MBank and
Opera indicate that in both cases around 80% of all sessions has the gmt unix time
ﬁeld determined by the clock while the remaining 20% of values are evenly dis-
tributed. Finally, the most interesting statistical ﬁngerprint corresponds to the
Skype traﬃc tunneled through TLS/SSL protocol: the gmt unix time ﬁeld is deter-
ministic and interpreted by network protocol analyzers as Jan 31, 2004 18:23:18
CET—the whole 32-byte long random structure is in fact deterministic (note that
it is normally used in the encryption process). Nevertheless, it is not so important
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for Skype—it uses TLS/SSL only to establish a tunnel bypassing ﬁrewalls and it
encrypts its data with a proprietary protocol.
So, in general, we can only determine a class of applications by inspecting the
timestamps. However, in the case of Skype, the deterministic value of gmt unix time
gives us an accurate signature for identifying the Skype traﬃc tunneled over TLS/SSL.
12.3 Classification Framework
Our classiﬁcation framework is built upon the Naive Bayes Classifier (NBC)
[30] that combines previously described methods, i.e. two Markov Classiﬁers corre-
sponding to server and client-side models and the Timestamp Classiﬁer that con-
siders the randomness of timestamps. The Naive Bayes Classiﬁer has been used
extensively in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation [3, 18] and proved to be very ef-
fective despite its simplicity [30].
The Naive Bayes Classiﬁer applies the Bayes theorem with a strong (naive)
assumption of the independence of input features describing an object. Let vector
F = F1, . . . , Fn represent the set of n features used to categorize an object in one
of C classes. By applying the Bayes theorem we can quantify probability P (C|F )
that the object represent class C using the a-priori probability P (F |C):
P (C|F ) =
P (C ∩ F )
P (F )
=
P (F |C)
P (F )
∗ P (C). (12.8)
As we assume that each feature Fi is conditionally independent of another fea-
ture Fj , where i 6= j and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we can write:
P (F |C) =
∏
i
P (Fi|C). (12.9)
In our classiﬁcation framework, diﬀerent classiﬁers play the role of features.
More speciﬁcally, class C is associated with one of seven applications, whereas
Fi may represent the server-side or/and the client-side message chain or/and the
timestamp ﬁngerprint of the session to analyze. The ﬁnal decision discriminating
between diﬀerent applications is made based on the Maximum Likelihood crite-
rion (cf. Eq. 12.6). Finally, in the presented framework, we naively assume the
independence between various classiﬁers, e.g., between MCS applied to messages
coming from the server side and MCC used to compute the probability of message
sequence originated at the client side. However, as our framework does not require a
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strong independence assumption of underlying classiﬁers, NBC results in very good
accuracy shown in the next section.
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13.1 Experiments
In this section, we present the results of applying the proposed classiﬁcation
framework to trace datasets.
13.1.1 Datasets
We have gathered three datasets at two edge routers located in Poland. Campus1
and Campus2 datasets come from a link connecting a campus network of the AGH
University of Science and Technology in Cracow to the Internet. The link has the
capacity of 70 Mbits/s for incoming and 30 Mbits/s for outgoing traﬃc. Campus1
dataset contains a one day long trace starting on Thursday, March 1, 2012, whereas
the 24 hours long Campus2 dataset was obtained starting on Saturday, March 26,
2012. Both datasets contain traﬃc generated by standard services such as web,
chat, mail, VoIP, ﬁle transfer, or streaming applications. The Campus2 dataset
is the most heterogenous one with numerous applications and a large number of
active online users reaching 500 people (majority of users are university students
and faculty). Due to strict policies enforced by ﬁrewalls and restrictions for certain
streaming and p2p applications, users commonly tunnel restricted traﬃc.
Enterprise dataset contains traces gathered during a 93 hour period starting
on Sunday, July 1, 2012 on a 20 Mbit/s link connecting a small IT company to
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the Internet. The traﬃc reﬂects the company proﬁle and mainly contains oﬃce
applications such as mail, VoIP, or web. There are no strict ﬁrewall rules applied at
the edge router. Enterprise dataset contains more homogeneous traﬃc than the
two datasets captured on the campus.
To establish the ground truth, we have developed a Domain Name System Clas-
sifier (DNSC) to extract and classify TLS/SSL application ﬂows according to their
domain names. More speciﬁcally, DNSC matches hostnames against our array of
signature strings like for example twitter, twttr in case of Twitter. The method
is simple and results in a very high conﬁdence level conﬁrmed by manual payload
inspection. Nevertheless, we might not cover all instances of signatures for a par-
ticular application. Another constraint of the approach is that we cannot obtain
the instances of applications if we are not able to resolve IP addresses into the
corresponding domain names. To overcome these limitations, we have used in our
experimental evaluation only the traﬃc for which the IP address resolution was
possible and corresponding strings are straightforward and unambiguous.
Table 13.1: Applications, the number of application ﬂows, the number of
servers vs. number of clients in three datasets
Application Campus1 Campus2 Enterprise
PayPal 546 (9 - 96) 434 (6 - 97) 172 (13 - 11)
Twitter 1411 (17 - 29) 1530 (13 - 30) 157 (11 - 6)
Dropbox 1160 (171 - 95) 3134 (317 - 133) 177 (31 - 9)
Gadu-Gadu 987 (50 - 321) 1196 (51 - 343) 30 (17 - 4)
MBank 321 (2 - 49) 2665 (3 - 51) 44 (2 - 6)
Opera 3246 (15 - 140) 4357 (13 - 132) 2034 (13 - 16)
Mozilla 2436 (20 - 271) 2669 (21 - 292) 2867 (24 - 68)
Table 13.1 shows the parameters of three datasets: the number of application
ﬂow samples and in the brackets, the number of servers versus the number of clients
that use the service (for example, Campus1 dataset contains the traces of 321 users
who have connected to 50 Gadu-Gadu servers in 987 ﬂows).
Table 13.2 presents more statistics on the relationship between datasets: the
corresponding number of servers and clients common to respective datasets (e.g.,
there are 6 common PayPal servers in Campus1 and Campus2 datasets as well as 46
common clients). Their purpose is to estimate the applicability of datasets. From
the joint analysis of two presented tables, in case of Gadu-Gadu for example, we can
expect very good classiﬁcation results if the server-side behavior is computed on the
basis of the Campus2 dataset and is applied to the Enterprise dataset (Campus2
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Table 13.2: Applications and the corresponding number of servers and clients
common to respective datasets
Application
Campus1 Enterprise Enterprise
∩ Campus2 ∩ Campus1 ∩ Campus2
PayPal 6 - 46 2 - 2 -
Twitter 12 - 8 9 - 9 -
Dropbox 113 - 65 19 - 21 -
Gadu-Gadu 44 - 230 16 - 16 -
MBank 1 - 12 1 - 1 -
Opera 13 - 105 12 - 11 -
Mozilla 17 - 169 6 - 6 -
contains almost all Gadu-Gadu servers accessed in Enterprise, 16 out of 17). By
contrast, we may expect slightly worse results for Gadu-Gadu client models because
of a small number of common clients (Campus2 has 343 clients diﬀerent from 4 clients
in the Enterprise dataset).
Finally, we will often refer to Skype as an example of traﬃc tunneled through
TLS/SSL. The evaluation runs on a set of packet traces referred to as Skype dataset
generated in the experiments of classifying Skype service ﬂows (cf. Section 9.2.1).
13.1.2 Criteria for Classification Performance
We assume that the classiﬁcation based on the DNSC reference classiﬁer pro-
vides the ground truth and we evaluate the proposed classiﬁers with respect to its
classiﬁcation decisions. We consider two meaningful metrics to assess the perfor-
mance of a classiﬁcation method: the True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate,
denoted as TPR and FPR, respectively (cf. Eq. 3.1, 3.2). TPR is known as sen-
sitivity, and 1− FPR is commonly referred to as specificity. True Positive occurs
when the classiﬁcation result is consistent with the classiﬁcation decision taken by
DNSC and the application session is correctly classiﬁed as a given application, e.g.,
a PayPal session is accurately recognized as PayPal. Conversely, False Positive
occurs when the classiﬁcation result is inconsistent with the decision taken by the
reference classiﬁer and a session is incorrectly classiﬁed, e.g., a Twitter session is
falsely recognized as PayPal.
13.1.3 Classification Results
In this section, we report on the classiﬁcation results of the proposed framework:
we ﬁrst test MCS+MCC+TC and MCS+TC on Campus1 and Enterprise datasets,
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respectively when Campus2 dataset served for training.
Table 13.3: Results for MCS+MCC+TC on Campus1 dataset: applications,
total number ﬂows, number of not classiﬁed ﬂows, absolute TP
and FP as well as their rates. Training set: Campus2
Application # ﬂows # missed # TP TPR #FP FPR
PayPal 546 55 437 0.89 54 0.006
Twitter 1411 30 1138 0.824 174 0.021
Dropbox 1160 1 1102 0.951 32 0.004
Gadu-Gadu 987 18 939 0.969 24 0.003
MBank 321 20 277 0.92 73 0.008
Opera 3246 224 2832 0.937 217 0.032
Mozilla 2436 5 2375 0.977 80 0.011
Table 13.3 shows the results for MCS+MCC+TC classiﬁers. Let us take the
example of Mozilla for which we observe that the TP rate is very large (97.7%) with
relatively small rate of FP (1.1%). The good results come from the fact that for
Mozilla, Campus1 and Campus2 share common servers and clients (Campus2 covers
17 out of 20 servers and 169 out of 271 clients that also occurred in the analyzed
Campus1 dataset, cf. Tables 13.1 and 13.2).
In the case of Twitter, we can observe less accurate results (TPR of 82.4%, FPR
of 2.1%), because the overlap of clients and servers in the two datasets is not so
signiﬁcant. By manual inspection, we have observed that the degradation in the
TP rate for Twitter is due to some similarities of its MC models with Opera and
MBank, which also results in a slightly higher rate of FP for Opera and MBank,
because some Twitter sessions are falsely classiﬁed as either Opera or MBank.
Table 13.4 presents the results for the MCS+TC classiﬁers on the Enterprise
dataset with the Campus2 dataset used for training. We can see that for Gadu-
Gadu, the classiﬁers have correctly recognized all application instances with only
two sessions incorrectly classiﬁed as Gadu-Gadu. A similar reasoning applies to
the Enterprise dataset—the training Campus2 dataset covers 16 out of 17 servers
(cf. Tables 13.1 and 13.2). However, notice that 17 Gadu-Gadu sessions (that
correspond to 56% of all application instances) were not classiﬁed. By manually
inspecting the ﬂows, we have observed slightly diﬀerent TLS/SSL message sequences
compared to those in the training phase.
All MBank sessions were correctly classiﬁed, but this time, there were no un-
recognized sessions (marked in Table 13.4 as missed). We can explain less accurate
results with TPR equal only to 64.3% for PayPal by a small number of session
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Table 13.4: Results for MCS+TC on Enterprise dataset: applications, total
number ﬂows, number of not classiﬁed ﬂows, absolute TP and FP
as well as their rates. Training set: Campus2
Application # ﬂows # missed # TP TPR #FP FPR
PayPal 172 29 92 0.643 212 0.04
Gadu-Gadu 30 17 13 1 2 0.000
Twitter 157 0 125 0.796 154 0.029
Dropbox 177 1 168 0.955 16 0.003
MBank 44 0 44 1 52 0.010
Opera 2034 4 1723 0.848 459 0.135
Mozilla 2867 2 2319 0.809 49 0.019
instances in the training phase. All manually inspected PayPal ﬂows either slightly
diﬀer from the pre-computed model or they are classiﬁed as other applications for
which the models were constructed using a richer set of session instances and have
a complex structure allowing for diverse messages sequences.
13.1.4 Classifier Selection
In this part, we want to evaluate the impact of the proposed classiﬁers on the
ﬁnal classiﬁcation decision by the framework. For all experiments reported in this
section, we analyze up to ﬁve transitions of both server and client-side Markov chains
(we explain the limit of ﬁve transitions in the discussion of parameter calibration
in Section 13.1.5). We consider the analysis of Campus1 and Enterprise datasets
under the training phase on Campus2 as well as the analysis of Campus1 and Campus2
datasets under the training phase on Enterprise. We present the results by plotting
TPR on y-axes and FPR on x-axes (cf. Figure 13.1)—the values correspond to
the average TPR and FPR obtained for each of seven applications, i.e. Gadu-
Gadu, MBank, Opera, PayPal, Mozilla, Twitter, and Dropbox. We test our Bayes
framework composed of: the single MCS, MCC, or TC classiﬁer, and the joint
MCS+TC, MCC+TC, MCS+MCC+TC classiﬁers.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the most heterogeneous Campus2 dataset used for training.
The left-hand side of Figure 13.1 presents the results of the analysis on Campus1 and
Enterprise datasets. We can observe that Markov models computed for the server
side give signiﬁcantly better results than the models constructed at the client side
regardless of the dataset used in the classiﬁcation process. Server-side models are
much easier to build and are more universal across diﬀerent networks, while client-
side models are more network-speciﬁc. Recall that clients on diﬀerent networks
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Enterprise dataset.
Enterprise as a training dataset leads to slightly worse results than in the pre-
vious case, because the MC models do not cover enough TLS/SSL session instances
to be eﬀective compared to the associated Campus1 and Campus2 datasets (cf. Ta-
bles 13.1 and 13.2). The results reported in the right top graph of Figure 13.1
indicate that the set of MCS+TC performs slightly better (TPR of 80.1%, FPR of
3.8%) than the jointly used MCC+MCS+TC classiﬁcation (TPR of 78.1%n FPR of
3.3%). Finally, the results obtained for the classiﬁcation of the most heterogeneous
Campus2 dataset are much worse for the MCS classiﬁer, which leads to the selection
of MCS+MCC+RC for the classiﬁcation framework (cf. the right bottom graph of
Figure 13.1).
From the above experimental results, we can conclude that
• MCS is the essential part of the classiﬁcation framework. If we build the
application models on a heterogenous training dataset that covers a wide
range of session instances, they can apply across diﬀerent subnetworks;
• MCC can be very eﬀective when the framework analyzes the datasets collected
on the same subnetwork used for collecting training datasets;
• the joint usage of TC with Markov classiﬁers gives considerably better classi-
ﬁcation results compared to the performance only based on MCS and MCC.
13.1.5 Parameter Calibration
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of a separately used server-side
or client-side Markov classiﬁer on the number of considered transitions in a given
Markov chain. We perform the sensitivity analysis on the most heterogenous Cam-
pus2 dataset pre-classiﬁed by applying DNSC classiﬁcation described in Section
13.1.1. TP and FP rates represent the average values obtained for each of seven
considered applications. Figure 13.2 presents the impact of the number of state
transitions used in both training and testing phase on TP and FP rates. We can
notice that for both TPR and FPR, classiﬁcation based on only 5 transitions is
roughly as accurate as classiﬁcation based on 100 transitions. These results high-
light the scalability of the proposed framework—it requires considering only several
ﬁrst TLS/SSL messages to obtain very good classiﬁcation results.
13.2 Conclusion
In this part, we have deﬁned a framework based on two complementary meth-
ods for classifying applications. The ﬁrst one uses a stochastic model representing
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Conclusions
Even though the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation is relatively well explored, our
primary goal is to enrich existing research eﬀorts by our own contributions. The
issues considered in this thesis were inspired by common problems existing in real -
operational networks. Thus, we have tried to bridge the gap between academia and
professional practice. In this chapter, we summarize the thesis claims and highlight
the future directions of this research.
Efficiency and scalability
In Part II, we have proposed a detection scheme for high-volume SYN ﬂooding
attacks and low-volume portscan activity. We have demonstrated that our
method achieves a high attack detection rate (True Positive Rate). Moreover,
in comparison with existing methods, we have reduced the False Positive
Rate, i.e., when legitimate packets are classiﬁed as malicious ones. Finally, by
using sampling methods, we have signiﬁcantly reduced the inﬂuence of packet
sampling on the performance of the detection scheme. However, as far as
scalability is concerned, we believe that the future practical implementation
based on Snort [61] or Bro [108] might be even more convincing than the
evaluation process based on the proof-of-the-concept algorithm presented in
this thesis.
Challenges ahead
Among various challenges in the domain of traﬃc analysis, classifying en-
crypted ﬂows seems to be the most urgent one because, an increased number
of applications make use of encryption, e.g., Tor [100], I2P [101], BitTorrent
[102], IMule [103], Skype [93]. In Part III, we have proposed a classiﬁcation
method for recognizing Skype encrypted traﬃc tunneled over SSL and iden-
tifying its service ﬂows. Then, in Part IV, we have deﬁned a more generic
framework based on two complementary methods for classifying applications
encrypted with TLS/SSL protocol. Our results shed a new light on the poten-
tial of approaches based on application-layer protocol analysis for encrypted
and tunneled traﬃc.
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Refute the myths
In the research community, there is a number of common beliefs that should
be veriﬁed such as the opinion that port-based classiﬁcation approaches are in-
adequate any longer in traﬃc classiﬁcation, or that DPI methods do not scale
to hight bandwidth rates. In our work, we argue the belief that payload-based
methods always fail in case of encrypted traﬃc. In Part IV, we have inves-
tigated in-depth TLS/SSL header structure and we have proposed a frame-
work for encrypted traﬃc classiﬁcation. We believe that there are still many
”myths” in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation that should be investigated in
detail and perhaps revised.
Formalization of the domain
A comparison (if possible) between diﬀerent methodologies is an important
part of any evaluation process. However, it is a diﬃcult task, not only due
to the lack of a shared testing platform or easily available packet traces, but
basically because of the lack of a common understanding of concepts such as
the deﬁnition of the classiﬁcation classes. In this thesis (cf. Section 3.2), we
have addressed this particular problem by proposing three classiﬁcation goals,
i.e., we propose to classify traﬃc according to its category, application-level
protocol, or application that generates traﬃc. Moreover, in Section 3.3 we
have presented an extended taxonomy for approaches in traﬃc classiﬁcation
based on the research presented in this thesis. For completeness, another
attempt aiming at formalizing the domain based on ontology paradigms has
been proposed recently [109].
Practical deployment
Many of research methodologies, especially based on statistical methods, have
never been evaluated in the real- -operational networks (with some excep-
tions, for example, TCP STatistic and Analysis Tool (Tstat) [110] or Hybrid
Traﬃc Identiﬁcation (HTI) [24]). Thus, as mentioned before, one of interest-
ing research directions would be practical implementation and deployment of
methods presented in this thesis in a campus network.
Inter-domain portability
Although, we have presented intrusion detection as a sub-domain of traﬃc
classiﬁcation problem, it is often considered in the literature as a separate
research subject. Thus, we believe that applying some of existing classiﬁcation
methods in detection of intrusive activity would be an interesting research
subject. Even if not presented in this thesis, we have successfully applied
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the method proposed in Part III to the detection of malicious traﬃc—the
propagation of Worm.Win32.Skipi.b that spreads over the Skype messenger
[111]. In the future work, we would like to explore how the proposed methods
can be extended to other classiﬁcation problems.
Appropriate feature selection
The problem of feature selection and parameter calibration has been well
studied in the domain of traﬃc classiﬁcation including the presented thesis.
However, we believe that some standard recommendations should be intro-
duced to separate training traces from datasets used in parameter tuning and
in the evaluation process. Indeed, feature selection and parameter calibration
methods tend to optimize performance results for particular datasets. More-
over, in the future work, we may consider automatic feature selection and
calibration process as a part of practical implementations.
Hybrid approaches
As it was mentioned earlier, in recent years, we have observed that application
developers tend to evade traﬃc classiﬁcation by encryption and other obfus-
cation methods. Even some governments are interested in an anonymous p2p
technology, for example, Tor project aims at protecting users’ privacy [100].
As a result, more complexed, hybrid methods combining diﬀerent approaches
should be applied in the future such as the one presented in Part III of the
thesis, which puts together traﬃc ﬂow features and complex DPI elements to
identify Skype service ﬂows.
Ground truth
The last but not least issue revised in the thesis conclusions is related to
pre-labeled datasets, namely to the ground-truth information, crucial for ev-
ery evaluation process. In Part IV, we have developed a simple method called
DNSC to extract encrypted application ﬂows according to their domain names.
Although the method can classify even encrypted traﬃc with high conﬁdence
level, it is characterized by a limited classiﬁcation scope. As a result, we be-
lieve that a common testbed based on multiple reliable, but not necessarily
scalable or light weight algorithms is required for cross-checking and generat-
ing a valid ground truth.
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